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Fiduciary Political Theory: A Critique 
abstract.  “Fiduciary political theory” is a burgeoning intellectual project that uses 
fiduciary principles to analyze public law. This Essay provides a framework for assessing the 
usefulness and limitations of fiduciary political theory. Our thesis is that fiduciary principles can 
be fruitfully applied to many domains of public law. However, other domains are incompatible 
with the basic structure of fiduciary norms. In these domains, fiduciary political theory is less 
likely to be viable.  
 One contribution of this Essay is to describe the underlying structure of fiduciary norms. 
We identify three features of these norms that differentiate them from norms of contract, tort, 
and criminal law. First, fiduciary norms impose deliberative requirements: they make specific 
types of demands on an agent’s deliberation in addition to her behavior. Second, complying with 
fiduciary norms requires a special conscientiousness. Living up to a fiduciary obligation depends 
not only on how an agent behaves and deliberates, but also on whether she does so for the right 
reasons. Third, fiduciary norms impose “robust” demands, which require the fiduciary to seek 
out and respond appropriately to new information about the interests of her beneficiaries. 
  We use these insights to assess applications of fiduciary principles to theories of judging, 
administrative governance, and international law. A fiduciary theory of judging can explain 
certain aspects of the norms of judging better than alternative theories offered by Ronald 
Dworkin and Judge Richard Posner. The viability of a fiduciary theory of administrative 
governance is an open question. Whether this kind of fiduciary political theory is superior to 
alternatives (like the instrumentalist theory of administrative governance developed by Adrian 
Vermeule) turns on a deeper dispute about whether administrative law reflects a culture of 
justification. Finally, a fiduciary political theory of international law (like the one defended by 
Evan Fox-Decent and Evan Criddle) is unlikely to succeed. Fiduciary norms are structurally 
incompatible with the domain of international law because compliance with international-law 
norms is a function of how states behave, rather than how they deliberate or why they behave as 
they do. 
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introduction 
“Fiduciary political theory” is an intellectual project that uses fiduciary 
principles to analyze aspects of public law.1 The idea that fiduciary principles 
apply to public offices (rather than solely to relationships in private law, where 
fiduciary norms originate) has a long pedigree, with roots in the writings of 
Cicero, Grotius, Locke, and The Federalist Papers.2  
In recent years, legal scholars and political philosophers from around the 
globe have revived this tradition. Several fiduciary political theorists address 
environmental and Indian law,3 where legal doctrines most explicitly invoke 
fiduciary concepts. Democratic theorists also invoke fiduciary principles to 
analyze the inevitability of discretion and the need for constraint that arise in 
basic questions of political representation and political legitimacy.4 More recent 
efforts of fiduciary political theorists investigate domains such as constitutional 
law,5 international law,6 administrative law,7 election law,8 the law governing 
public officials,9 and even the basic structure of political authority.10 
 
1. See Ethan J. Leib, David L. Ponet, & Michael Serota, Translating Fiduciary Principles into 
Public Law, 126 HARV. L. REV. F. 91, 91 (2013) (coining the term “fiduciary political theory”).  
2. See MARCUS TULLIUS CICERO, DE OFFICIIS 87 (E.H. Warmington ed., Walter Miller trans., 
Harvard Univ. Press 1968) (c. 44 B.C.E.); HUGONIS GROTII, DE JURE BELLI ET PACIS: LIBRI 
TRES 124-25 (William Whewell trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1853) (1625); THE FEDERALIST 
NO. 65, at 397 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (identifying public 
officers as bound by a “public trust”); THE FEDERALIST NO. 46, supra, at 294 (James 
Madison) (“The federal and State governments are in fact but different agents and trustees 
of the people . . . .”); JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE: AN ESSAY CONCERNING THE 
TRUE ORIGINAL, EXTENT, AND END OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT (1690), reprinted in TWO 
TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT AND A LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION 101, 160 (Ian Shapiro 
ed., 2003). 
3. See MARY CHRISTINA WOOD, NATURE’S TRUST: ENVIRONMENTAL LAW FOR A NEW 
ECOLOGICAL AGE (2014); Reid Peyton Chambers, Judicial Enforcement of Federal Trust 
Responsibility to Indians, STAN. L. REV. 1213 (1975); Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in 
Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 471 (1970).  
4. See Paul Finn, The Forgotten “Trust”: The People and the State, in EQUITY: ISSUES AND TRENDS 
131 (Malcolm Cope ed., 1995); Paul Finn, Public Trust and Public Accountability, 3 GRIFFITH 
L. REV. 224 (1994).  
5. See Scott R. Bauries, A Common Law Constitutionalism for the Right to Education, 48 GA. L. 
REV. 949 (2014); Gary Lawson et al., The Fiduciary Foundations of Federal Equal Protection, 94 
B.U. L. REV. 415 (2014); Robert G. Natelson, The Constitution and the Public Trust, 52 BUFF. 
L. REV. 1077 (2004); Robert G. Natelson, The General Welfare Clause and the Public Trust: An 
Essay in Original Understanding, 52 U. KAN. L. REV. 1 (2003). In addition, core fiduciary 
concepts like loyalty inform the work of several prominent constitutional theorists who do 
not specifically identify their work as a species of fiduciary legal theory. E.g., David Fontana, 
Government in Opposition, 119 YALE L.J. 548 (2009); Heather K. Gerken, The Loyal 
Opposition, 123 YALE L.J. 1958 (2014); Jeremy Waldron, The Principle of Loyal Opposition 
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This Essay provides a framework for analyzing the usefulness and 
limitations of fiduciary political theory. Our thesis is that fiduciary principles 
can be fruitfully applied to many domains of public law. However, other 
domains are incompatible with the basic structure of fiduciary norms. In these 
domains, fiduciary political theory is not viable. The main contributions of this 
 
(N.Y. Univ. Sch. of Law, Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research Paper Series, Working Paper 
No. 12-22, 2011), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2045647 [http://perma.cc/4HU3-T6K9].  
6. See EVAN J. CRIDDLE & EVAN FOX-DECENT, FIDUCIARIES OF HUMANITY: HOW INTERNATIONAL 
LAW CONSTITUTES AUTHORITY (forthcoming 2016) [hereinafter CRIDDLE & FOX-DECENT, 
FIDUCIARIES OF HUMANITY]; Eyal Benvenisti, Sovereigns as Trustees of Humanity: On the 
Accountability of States to Foreign Stakeholders, 107 AM. J. INT’L L. 295 (2013); Evan J. Criddle, 
A Sacred Trust of Civilization: Fiduciary Foundations of International Law, in PHILOSOPHICAL 
FOUNDATIONS OF FIDUCIARY LAW 404 (Andrew S. Gold & Paul B. Miller eds., 2014) 
[hereinafter Criddle, Sacred Trust]; Evan J. Criddle, Proportionality in Counterinsurgency: A 
Relational Theory, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1073 (2012); Evan J. Criddle, Standing for Human 
Rights Abroad, 100 CORNELL L. REV. 269 (2015); Evan J. Criddle, Three Grotian Theories of 
Humanitarian Intervention, 16 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 473 (2015); Evan J. Criddle & Evan 
Fox-Decent, A Fiduciary Theory of Jus Cogens, 34 YALE J. INT’L L. 331 (2009) [hereinafter 
Criddle & Fox-Decent, Jus Cogens]; Evan J. Criddle & Evan Fox-Decent, Human Rights, 
Emergencies, and the Rule of Law, 34 HUM. RTS. Q. 39 (2012); Evan Fox-Decent & Evan J. 
Criddle, The Fiduciary Constitution of Human Rights, 15 LEGAL THEORY 301 (2009) 
[hereinafter Fox-Decent & Criddle, Human Rights]; Jeremy Waldron, Are Sovereigns Entitled 
to the Benefit of the International Rule of Law?, 22 EUR. J. INT’L L. 315 (2011).  
7. See Evan J. Criddle, Fiduciary Administration: Rethinking Popular Representation in Agency 
Rulemaking, 88 TEX. L. REV. 441 (2010) [hereinafter Criddle, Fiduciary Administration]; Evan 
J. Criddle, Fiduciary Foundations of Administrative Law, 54 UCLA L. REV. 117 (2006) 
[hereinafter Criddle, Fiduciary Foundations]; Evan J. Criddle, Mending Holes in the Rule of 
(Administrative) Law, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 1271 (2010) [hereinafter Criddle, Mending Holes]; 
Evan J. Criddle, When Delegation Begets Domination: Due Process of Administrative 
Lawmaking, 46 GA. L. REV. 117 (2011). 
8. See D. Theodore Rave, Politicians as Fiduciaries, 126 HARV. L. REV. 671 (2013). 
9. See Sung Hui Kim, The Last Temptation of Congress: Legislator Insider Trading and the 
Fiduciary Norm Against Corruption, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 845 (2013); Ethan J. Leib & David L. 
Ponet, Fiduciary Representation and Deliberative Engagement with Children, 20 J. POL. PHIL. 178 
(2012); Donna M. Nagy, Insider Trading, Congressional Officials, and Duties of Entrustment, 91 
B.U. L. REV. 1105 (2011); Michael A. Perino, A Scandalous Perversion of Trust: Modern Lessons 
from the Early History of Congressional Insider Trading, 67 RUTGERS U. L. REV. 335 (2015); E. 
Mabry Rogers & Stephen B. Young, Public Office as a Public Trust: A Suggestion That 
Impeachment for High Crimes and Misdemeanors Implies a Fiduciary Standard, 63 GEO. L.J. 1025 
(1975). 
10. See EVAN FOX-DECENT, SOVEREIGNTY’S PROMISE: THE STATE AS FIDUCIARY (2011); Jedediah 
Purdy & Kimberly Fielding, Sovereigns, Trustees, Guardians: Private-Law Concepts and the 
Limits of Legitimate State Power, 70 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 165 (2007).  
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Essay are to reveal the underlying structure of fiduciary norms and to show 
when fiduciary political theorizing is likely (or unlikely) to work.11  
Toward these ends, we highlight three features of fiduciary norms that 
differentiate them from norms of contract, tort, and criminal law. First, 
fiduciary norms impose deliberative requirements: they make specific types of 
demands on an agent’s deliberation in addition to her behavior. Second, 
complying with fiduciary norms requires a special conscientiousness. Living up 
to a fiduciary obligation depends not only on how an agent behaves and 
deliberates, but also on whether she does so for the right reasons. Third, 
fiduciary norms impose what Philip Pettit calls “robust” demands,12 which 
require the fiduciary to seek out and respond appropriately to new information 
about the interests of her beneficiaries.  
Fiduciary political theory is not viable in public-law domains where any of 
these core features of fiduciary norms are inapposite. In other words, fiduciary 
political theorizing is unlikely to work in legal contexts where behavior, rather 
than deliberation, is the coin of the realm; where any way of conforming to a 
norm counts as living up to it; or where norms do not impose robust demands. 
Part I of this Essay develops the claim that fiduciary norms should be 
applied only in public-law contexts that are compatible with the basic structure 
of fiduciary norms. It then provides a framework for determining whether and 
when fiduciary political theorizing is likely to be viable.  
Part II analyzes several recent efforts to apply fiduciary principles  
to domains of public law through the framework developed in Part I: 
judging,13 administrative governance,14 and international law.15 We conclude 
 
11. A note on our use of the terms “fiduciary norms” and “fiduciary principles”: According to a 
definition of norms that we find appealing, every norm has both a normative element (that 
is, it is constituted by “normative principles”) and a socio-empirical element (in that it 
operates over and is “somehow accepted in” the particular domain over which it applies). See 
GEOFFREY BRENNAN ET AL., EXPLAINING NORMS 2-3 (2013). On our usage, fiduciary norms 
are constituted by fiduciary principles (which are usually, but not necessarily, stated in the 
form of requirements applicable to the fiduciary) that operate over and are accepted within 
the domains (generally those in private law) over which fiduciary laws apply. Thus, 
fiduciary duties are established and entailed by fiduciary norms and principles. We take the 
latter two, rather than the former, to be the fundamental unit of analysis. 
12. PHILIP PETTIT, THE ROBUST DEMANDS OF THE GOOD: ETHICS WITH ATTACHMENT, VIRTUE, 
AND RESPECT (2015).  
13. See Ethan J. Leib, David L. Ponet & Michael Serota, A Fiduciary Theory of Judging, 101 CALIF. 
L. REV. 699 (2013). 
14. See Criddle, Fiduciary Administration, supra note 7; Criddle, Fiduciary Foundations, supra note 
7; Criddle, Mending Holes, supra note 7. 
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that fiduciary theories of judging explain certain aspects of judicial  
norms better than prominent theories offered by Ronald Dworkin16 and  
Judge Richard Posner.17 By contrast, the viability of fiduciary theories of 
administrative governance is an open question. Whether the fiduciary theory is 
superior to alternatives (like the instrumentalist theory of administrative 
governance developed by Adrian Vermeule)18 turns on a deeper dispute about 
whether administrative law reflects a culture of justification. Finally, our 
analysis suggests that fiduciary political theories of international law are 
unlikely to succeed. Fiduciary norms are structurally incompatible with the 
domain of international law because compliance with international-law norms 
is a function of how states behave, rather than how they deliberate or why they 
behave as they do.  
i .  f iduciary political  theory:  a  precept and a framework 
This Part first offers a limiting precept for fiduciary theorizing about public 
law (in Section I.A) and then (in Section I.B) provides a framework to analyze 
when fiduciary norms are compatible with a domain of public law. 
A. Limiting the Expansion of Fiduciary Norms 
A fiduciary relationship traditionally emerges in contexts where one person 
(the fiduciary) has discretionary power over the assets or legal interests of 
another (the beneficiary).19 Standard private-law examples of fiduciary 
 
15. See CRIDDLE & FOX-DECENT, FIDUCIARIES OF HUMANITY, supra note 6; Criddle, Sacred Trust, 
supra note 6; Criddle & Fox-Decent, Jus Cogens, supra note 6; Fox-Decent & Criddle, Human 
Rights, supra note 6. 
16. See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, JUSTICE IN ROBES (2006); see also infra notes 109-112 and 
accompanying text. 
17. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW, PRAGMATISM, AND DEMOCRACY (2003); see also infra 
notes 114-118 and accompanying text. 
18. See, e.g., Adrian Vermeule, Our Schmittian Administrative Law, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1095 
(2009). 
19. See Paul B. Miller, A Theory of Fiduciary Liability, 56 MCGILL L.J. 235 (2011). According to the 
Supreme Court of Canada’s judgment in Frame v. Smith:  
Relationships in which a fiduciary obligation have [sic] been imposed seem to 
possess three general characteristics: 
(1) The fiduciary has scope for the exercise of some discretion or power.  
(2) The fiduciary can unilaterally exercise that power or discretion so as to 
affect the beneficiary’s legal or practical interests.  
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relationships include attorney-client, trustee-beneficiary, corporate 
officeholder-shareholder, and guardian-ward.20 In such relationships, the 
fiduciary has discretion to act on behalf of the beneficiary. The beneficiary is 
vulnerable to the fiduciary’s predatory or self-dealing actions within this 
discretionary sphere, yet must still repose her trust in the fiduciary. The 
fiduciary is obligated to prioritize the beneficiary’s interests over her own.21 At 
least three general indicia characterize fiduciary relationships: discretion, trust, 
and vulnerability. In relationships exhibiting these indicia, a fiduciary is subject 
to specific duties—usually, duties of loyalty and care—that govern her actions 
on behalf of the beneficiary. 
There are several good reasons to interpret public-law relationships in light 
of fiduciary norms. First, there is considerable historical precedent for thinking 
about public-law relationships in this way.22 Second, the architecture of the 
fiduciary relationship often fits the obligations of public officeholders, allowing 
fruitful analogies from private law to public law. Third, fiduciary political 
theories are grounded in inherent features of authority, rather than the consent 
of the governed. Thus, the fiduciary political theorist can address fundamental 
questions about political authority while avoiding issues related to consent that 
have befuddled political theorists (particularly those in the social-contract 
tradition) for hundreds of years.23 In identifying what makes an exercise of 
power legitimate, the fiduciary political theorist focuses on how that power is 
actually used, rather than solely on the etiology of the institutions that purport 
to exercise it. 
Despite these synergies, some scholars doubt the viability of fiduciary 
political theory on the basis of putative disanalogies between public and private 
 
(3) The beneficiary is peculiarly vulnerable to or at the mercy of the fiduciary 
holding the discretion of power. 
[1987] 2 S.C.R. 99, 136. 
20. See D. Gordon Smith, The Critical Resource Theory of Fiduciary Duty, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1399, 
1412 (2002). 
21. See, e.g., LEONARD I. ROTMAN, FIDUCIARY LAW 309-66 (2005); J.C. SHEPHERD, THE LAW OF 
FIDUCIARIES 197-208 (1981); L.S. Sealy, Fiduciary Relationships, 1962 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 69; 
J.C. Shepherd, Towards a Unified Concept of Fiduciary Relationships, 97 LAW Q. REV. 51 
(1981); Ernest J. Weinrib, The Fiduciary Obligation, 25 U. TORONTO L.J. 1 (1975). 
22. See sources cited supra note 2. 
23. For a more elaborate discussion of the benefits of, and existing approaches to, fiduciary 
political theory, see Stephen R. Galoob & Ethan J. Leib, Fiduciary Political Theory and 
Legitimacy, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON FIDUCIARY LAW (D. Gordon Smith & Andrew Gold 
eds., forthcoming 2017). 
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law.24 However, this kind of skepticism reaches only some types of fiduciary 
political theory—namely, those that seek to analogize private-law fiduciaries 
with public-law actors. Such skepticism does not indict fiduciary political 
theory as such. Our focus here is on a broader, more structural concern. The 
most serious possible objection to fiduciary political theory—one that threatens 
the enterprise as such—is that private-law fiduciary norms are fundamentally 
incompatible with the structure of public-law norms.  
B. The Structure of Fiduciary Norms  
What, then, are the features of fiduciary norms that determine the viability 
of fiduciary political theory? Attempts to answer this question have proven 
contentious. Scholars of fiduciary law disagree about the contours and content 
of fiduciary norms. For example, they disagree about the bases of fiduciary 
norms, what obligations they impose, and how fiduciary norms differ from 
nonfiduciary norms.25 Some contend that fiduciary norms have a uniform 
content or structure, while others argue that notions like loyalty and care vary 
substantially across contexts.26 Further, commentators disagree about whether 
 
24. See, e.g., Seth Davis, The False Promise of Fiduciary Government, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1145, 
1162 (2014) (“[T]rust law defines the fiduciary duties of trustees by reference to a discrete 
class of beneficiaries, whose interests are discernible and observable through a well 
understood maxim and rooted in prevailing investment strategies. There is no real analogue 
in public law.”). 
25. See MATTHEW CONAGLEN, FIDUCIARY LOYALTY: PROTECTING THE DUE PERFORMANCE OF 
NON-FIDUCIARY DUTIES 72 (2010) (defending a theory according to which “the normative 
justification for [the] existence [of the duty of loyalty] is to avoid situations which involve a 
risk of breach of non-fiduciary duties”); Paul B. Miller, Justifying Fiduciary Duties, 58 
MCGILL L.J. 969, 1016 (2013) (defending a theory on which “the duty of loyalty is best 
understood in terms of normatively salient formal properties of the fiduciary relationship”); 
Lionel Smith, Fiduciary Relationships: Ensuring the Loyal Exercise of Judgement on Behalf of 
Another, 130 LAW Q. REV. 608, 612 (2014) (“[T]he requirement of loyalty is inherent in 
certain powers, because of the way in which they are created . . . . [L]oyalty is required in 
truly advisory relationships, because of the nature of advice.”). 
26. Compare Smith, supra note 20, at 1401 (positing a “unified theory of fiduciary duty”), with 
Avihay Dorfman, On Trust and Transubstantiation: Mitigating the Excesses of Ownership, in 
PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF FIDUCIARY LAW, supra note 6, at 339, 344 (contending that 
the existence and content of the fiduciary duty of loyalty can only be adequately explained 
by “taking seriously the relevant legal form in which fiduciary duties arise”), and Andrew S. 
Gold, The Loyalties of Fiduciary Law, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF FIDUCIARY LAW, 
supra note 6, at 176, 194 (concluding that fiduciary law implicates “different kinds of loyalty 
for different kinds of relationship[s]” and that “[l]oyalty varies in our social experiences—it 
also varies in the law”). 
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the legal instantiations of fiduciary notions like loyalty resemble nonlegal 
analogues of those concepts.27 Our goal here is not to resolve these debates. 
Rather, abstracting from disagreements about the substance of fiduciary 
norms exposes important structural features of fiduciary norms. In this Section 
we identify three such structural features that are crucial to understanding how 
fiduciary norms differ from other kinds of legal norms. Our analysis does not 
presuppose any particular substantive account of the grounds, contours, or 
content of fiduciary norms. As such, each of the features we identify can be 
appreciated by almost all fiduciary legal and political theorists.28  
First, fiduciary norms govern deliberation in addition to behavior (Section 
I.B.1). An agent who does not deliberate in the way that a fiduciary norm calls 
for thereby fails to live up to that norm, no matter how she behaves. Second, 
fiduciary norms impose standards of conscientiousness (Section I.B.2). Some 
ways of conforming one’s behavior and deliberation to the requirements 
imposed by a fiduciary norm nevertheless violate that norm. As a result, 
fiduciary norms invite what are sometimes called “wrong kinds of reason” 
problems. Third, fiduciary norms are robustly demanding (Section I.B.3). The 
requirements they impose morph based on changes to the world and to the 
beneficiary’s circumstances. One implication of the robustness of fiduciary 
norms is that they impose an “updating” requirement: a fiduciary must be 
disposed to monitor changes to the world relevant to promoting a beneficiary’s 
interests or ends and also be disposed to revise her efforts in light of these 
changes.  
Although some of these features characterize other types of legal norms, 
fiduciary norms are unique in being simultaneously characterized by all three. 
 
27. Compare TAMAR FRANKEL, FIDUCIARY LAW 89 (2011) (“The themes of fairness, prohibition 
of corruption, ethical behavior, and consideration of the common good reverberate in . . . 
ancient fiduciary law.”), with CONAGLEN, supra note 25, at 109 (“Imprecise references to 
morality, ungrounded in the fiduciary principles applied in the case law, do not accurately 
reflect the basis of fiduciary doctrine.”), and Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, 
Contract and Fiduciary Duty, 36 J.L. & ECON. 425, 427 (1993) (“Fiduciary duties are not 
special duties; they have no moral footing; they are the same sort of obligations, derived and 
enforced in the same way, as other contractual undertakings.”).  
28. The structural features identified here are implicit in fiduciary norms, although these 
features are only rarely made explicit in fiduciary law. As such, our argument is one of 
necessity: any substantive theory of fiduciary law and norms (as well as any effort at 
fiduciary political theory) must be able to account for these features. We do not contend that 
these features are jointly sufficient for understanding fiduciary authority or the fiduciary 
relationship. Moreover, although we contend that these features characterize fiduciary 
concepts at a general level, we leave open whether any of these features can be 
operationalized in different ways across fiduciary contexts. Thanks to Andrew Gold and to 
anonymous reviewers for the Yale Law Journal for suggesting this clarification of the scope 
of our argument.  
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In the remainder of this Section, we explain each of these features and their 
implications. To demonstrate why the coincidence of these features is 
distinctive to fiduciary norms, we provide comparisons to other types of legal 
norms, particularly the norms of contract, tort, and criminal law.  
1. Deliberation 
Norms typically govern behavior.29 However, some norms are deliberation 
sensitive30—that is, they can “bear[] upon what goes on inside people’s heads” 
by “demand[ing] that we have or form certain attitudes and that we think or 
deliberate in certain ways.”31 When a norm is deliberation sensitive, whether 
someone lives up to it depends on whether she forms the attitudes, thinks, or 
deliberates in the ways that the norm requires.32  
Several scholars have noticed that fiduciary norms are deliberation 
sensitive.33 For example, according to the “shaping account” of fiduciary loyalty 
that we have articulated in previous work, a fiduciary acts loyally only if she 
attributes nonderivative significance to the interests of her beneficiary.34 A 
fiduciary whose deliberation is not shaped by the beneficiary’s interests does 
not live up to the duty of loyalty, regardless of how she otherwise behaves.35 
Likewise, what Paul Miller calls the “principle of prudence” construes the 
 
29. See, e.g., Richard H. McAdams & Eric B. Rasmusen, Norms and the Law, in 2 HANDBOOK OF 
LAW AND ECONOMICS 1573, 1576 (A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell eds., 2007) (“All 
contributors to the [law and economics] literature seem to agree that a norm at least 
includes the element of a behavioral regularity in a group.” (emphasis omitted)).  
30. See Stephen Galoob & Adam Hill, Norms, Attitudes, and Compliance, 50 TULSA L. REV. 613, 
618 (2015) (book review).  
31. BRENNAN ET AL., supra note 11, at 193, 245. 
32. Some commentators even go so far as to argue that all social or formal norms are 
deliberation insensitive. See, e.g., id. at 50 (“[F]ormal norms typically involve normative 
principles that apply only to actions. Indeed, it seems that there would be something very 
odd in the case of laws that made demands on our attitudes.”); ERIC A. POSNER, LAW AND 
SOCIAL NORMS 24 (2000) (“[S]ocial norms are always about observed behavior.” (emphasis 
omitted)). However, this position seems incorrect, since the norms of various moral and 
religious systems straightforwardly impose demands on deliberation. 
33. See, e.g., Arthur B. Laby, The Fiduciary Obligation as the Adoption of Ends, 56 BUFF. L. REV. 
99, 103 (2008); Lionel Smith, The Motive, Not the Deed, in RATIONALIZING PROPERTY, 
EQUITY, AND TRUSTS: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF EDWARD BURN 53, 67 (Joshua Getzler ed., 
2003); Leo E. Strine, Jr. et al., Loyalty’s Core Demand: The Defining Role of Good Faith in 
Corporation Law, 98 GEO. L.J. 629, 633 (2010). 
34. See Stephen R. Galoob & Ethan J. Leib, Intentions, Compliance, and Fiduciary Obligations, 20 
LEGAL THEORY 106, 115 (2014). 
35. Id. at 116-18.  
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fiduciary duty of care as deliberation sensitive.36 According to Miller, this 
principle “requires that the fiduciary show due care when acting as 
fiduciary . . . in pursuing the objects which ground her authority,” which in 
turn imposes deliberative and attitudinal ideals that vary across fiduciary 
contexts.37 In Miller’s argument the fiduciary duty of care is equivalent to a 
duty to be careful; in failing to be careful, a fiduciary fails to live up to the 
norm.38  
Other types of legal norms are not deliberation sensitive in the ways that 
fiduciary norms are. For example, tort-law norms are, in general, deliberation 
insensitive: violation of a tort-law duty of care is triggered by an action,  
and (for the purposes of tort law) an act is an “external manifestation of an 
actor’s will.”39 Likewise, default contractual norms are generally deliberation 
insensitive: usually, whether one lives up to her contractual obligations is a 
matter of how she behaves.40  
Criminal-law norms, by contrast, are usually sensitive to deliberation in the 
form of mens rea. How an individual deliberates determines, in part, whether 
she is subject to criminal liability. However, the deliberation sensitivity of 
criminal norms differs from that of fiduciary norms. In judging whether 
someone has lived up to a criminal norm, behavior is a threshold issue. An 
agent’s deliberation is relevant only insofar as her behavior does not conform 
to that prescribed by the norm; deliberation is not relevant independently of 
behavior.41 The same conclusion does not apply to fiduciary norms, where 
deliberation is a freestanding requirement.  
 
36. Paul B. Miller, Principles of Public Fiduciary Administration, in BOUNDARIES OF STATE, 
BOUNDARIES OF RIGHTS (Anat Scolnicov & Tsvi Kahana eds., forthcoming 2016) 
(manuscript at 24-26) (on file with authors).  
37. Id. at 25. 
38. Some formulations of fiduciary norms expressly recognize the idea that the fiduciary duty of 
care has a deliberative element. See, e.g., 1 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING 
LAWYERS § 16(1) (AM. LAW INST. 2000) (requiring a lawyer’s representation to “proceed in a 
manner reasonably calculated to advance a client’s lawful objectives, as defined by the client 
after consultation”). 
39. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 2 (AM. LAW INST. 1965). 
40. See, e.g., Matthew S. Bedke, Explaining Compensatory Duties, 16 LEGAL THEORY 91 (2010); 
Alan Schwartz & Joel Watson, Conceptualizing Contractual Interpretation, 42 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 
(2013). 
41. Joel Feinberg, Some Unswept Debris from the Hart-Devlin Debate, 72 SYNTHESE 249, 259-60 
(1987). To be sure, deliberation is relevant to criminal law, since certain patterns of 
deliberation can change whether specific behavior is subject to liability. Deliberation only 
matters, however, once the behavior has been performed.  
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To illustrate the special deliberation sensitivity of fiduciary norms, consider 
a modified version of an example developed by Ken Simons42:  
Operation: A medical procedure involves cutting a tendon. This 
procedure is highly risky: there is a thirty percent chance of injury to 
the patient even if the procedure is performed correctly, and a far 
higher chance of injury when the procedure is performed incorrectly. 
Danielle Doctor is a physician who has badly botched every such 
procedure that she has performed to date. Unaware of Danielle’s 
history of failure, Paul Patient asks Danielle to perform the procedure 
on him, and Danielle agrees. During the procedure, Danielle, by luck, 
guesses the correct tendon to cut and thus performs the procedure in 
exactly the way that a competent physician would. However, Paul is 
among the unlucky thirty percent of patients who sustain injury when 
the procedure is performed correctly. 
The Operation case illustrates the deliberative aspects of criminal and fiduciary 
norms, regardless of whether either type of norm actually applies to physicians 
like Danielle in this (or any) legal system.  
Simons contends that Danielle would not be subject to criminal liability in 
Operation. General incompetence like Danielle’s does not violate criminal 
norms, because a “free-floating incapacity or incompetence is never relevant to 
criminal liability.”43 To the extent that a physician is ever criminally liable for 
negligence, “it is not [her] general incompetence that justifies punishment,” so 
much as the “highly deficient skill revealed in [a] particular operation.”44 
Because, as a matter of luck, Danielle’s performance in this operation did not 
manifest her lack of skill, criminal liability “would be unwarranted.”45  
Simons’s comments suggest that criminal norms adopt what we will call a 
manifestation requirement: mental states (e.g., how an agent deliberates, what 
she intends, what she disregards) and their absence matter to criminal liability 
only insofar as they are connected with an agent’s behavior. As Gideon Yaffe 
puts it, “mens rea is essential” to judgments of liability for violating criminal 
norms, “but it isn’t relevant unless it’s manifested” in behavior.46 This 
 
42. See Kenneth W. Simons, Does Punishment for “Culpable Indifference” Simply Punish for “Bad 
Character”? Examining the Requisite Connection Between Mens Rea and Actus Reus, 6 BUFF. 
CRIM. L. REV. 219, 258-59 (2002). 
43. Id. at 259.  
44. Id.  
45. Id.  
46. Gideon Yaffe, The Voluntary Act Requirement, in THE ROUTLEDGE COMPANION TO 
PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 174, 184 (Andrei Marmor ed., 2012); see also R. A. DUFF, CRIMINAL 
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requirement explains the criminal-law nostrum that punishment should be for 
acts, rather than for status: to punish in the absence of an action is to punish an 
agent for her presumed mental state, even though it has not caused her to 
behave in any particular way. It also explains the general disdain for so-called 
“thought crimes,” since these crimes punish for mental states that have not 
been manifested in an agent’s behavior.47  
The Operation case illustrates that fiduciary norms are sensitive to 
deliberation in a different way than criminal norms are. If fiduciary norms 
applied to Danielle, then she would have failed to live up to them because her 
faulty pattern of deliberation is an instance of both carelessness and disloyalty. 
Fiduciary norms therefore reject the manifestation requirement. Disloyalty or 
carelessness can constitute a violation of these norms, regardless of whether or 
how these mental states are revealed in behavior.48  
Consider an alternative version of the Operation scenario in which Paul 
does not suffer any injury from the procedure. Since fiduciary norms reject the 
manifestation requirement, it follows that Danielle would violate her fiduciary 
duties in this alternative scenario.49 Because of the way that fiduciary norms are 
sensitive to deliberation, someone can violate these norms solely through a 
faulty pattern of deliberation, regardless of whether this deliberation manifests 
in behavior.  
Our analysis so far has concerned negligence, or the failure to appreciate a 
substantial and unjustifiable risk of which one should have been aware. 
However, our conclusions seem even stronger when applied to more involved 
mental states, like the mens rea of purpose that forms the core of attempt 
liability. There is no such thing as tort or contract liability for attempt. In 
general, failed attempts to harm someone do not violate tort norms. Likewise, 
 
ATTEMPTS 349-50 (1997) (defending the “action principle” of criminal liability, according to 
which the “constitutive grounds of our criminal liability should be, not our criminal 
intentions or undesirable character traits, but the actions through which we actualize those 
intentions or character traits”). 
47. Gabriel Mendlow, Thought Crime 1-2 (Jan. 26, 2016) (unpublished manuscript) (on file 
with authors) (noting that the prohibition on criminal punishment for “thoughts alone” 
includes both an empirical claim that “our legal system does not criminalize or punish mere 
thought” and a moral claim that “if our legal system did criminalize and punish mere 
thought, it would do something profoundly wrong”).  
48. Fiduciary theorists might disagree about which deliberative responsibilities fiduciary norms 
impose, as well as how courts should inquire into the deliberation of fiduciaries. However, 
in order to square with the concept of loyalty, all accounts of fiduciary norms should agree 
that fiduciary duties impose freestanding deliberative requirements.  
49. For a real-world example of fiduciary norms being violated by conduct that does not harm 
the beneficiary, see In re Nine Systems Corp. Shareholder Litigation, No. 3940-VCN, 2014 WL 
4383127 (Del. Ch. Sept. 4, 2014).  
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someone who tries his best to breach a contract but winds up performing 
anyway does not necessarily violate contractual norms.  
Criminal norms, of course, prohibit attempts. Someone who tries but fails 
to assault another person commits a crime—namely, the crime of attempt, 
rather than the crime of assault. Fiduciary norms seem to prohibit attempts as 
well. A fiduciary who tries to betray her principal has been disloyal, regardless 
of whether these efforts succeed.50 Thus, both criminal and fiduciary norms 
regarding attempts are deliberation sensitive. Here, too, there are differences in 
how deliberation matters, as demonstrated by the following scenario:  
Wicked Operation: Assume the same medical procedure and 
protagonists as in Operation. Paul Patient asks Danielle Doctor to 
perform the operation on him. Danielle determines that she dislikes 
Paul, and she forms a plan to cut the wrong tendon during the 
operation, which will cause Paul excruciating pain. To remind herself of 
this plan (which she is likely to forget given her busy schedule), 
Danielle writes “Cut tendon to injure Paul during operation” into her 
notebook, and affixes her personal seal to the page. Danielle’s policy is 
to be fully committed to carrying out any plan to which she affixes her 
seal. 
Has Danielle attempted to harm Paul in Wicked Operation? If traditional 
criminal norms applied in this case, then Danielle would almost certainly not 
have violated them at the point where the scenario cuts off. In general, criminal 
norms prohibiting attempts require not only that the defendant have the 
purpose to commit an object crime, but also that she take some action toward 
the commission of that crime.51 Danielle’s plan to injure Paul during the 
procedure would satisfy the mental-state requirement for attempt. Her 
behavior, however, would not satisfy any existing formulation of the act 
requirement for attempt. In the language of criminal law, writing the plan in 
the notebook and affixing the seal would likely be considered “mere 
preparation,” rather than behavior constituting a substantial step toward the 
 
50. See, e.g., Sandra K. Miller, The Role of the Court in Balancing Contractual Freedom with the 
Need for Mandatory Constraints on Opportunistic and Abusive Conduct in the LLC, 152 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1609, 1640-42 (2004) (noting that, under Delaware corporate law, a “clandestine 
attempt to merge” two companies was a violation of the fiduciary duties of directors, even 
though the merger never actually happened). 
51. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01(1)(c), (2) (AM. LAW INST., Proposed Official Draft 1962) 
(requiring that liability for attempt be grounded, in part, on “an act or omission constituting 
a substantial step in a course of conduct planned to culminate in his commission of the 
crime,” and defining “substantial step” as behavior that is “strongly corroborative of the 
actor’s criminal purpose”).  
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result of injuring Paul.52 One explanation for this conclusion is that criminal 
norms embrace the manifestation requirement: Danielle has not attempted to 
injure Paul because her plan has not yet been manifest in her behavior.53 Merely 
planning to harm someone is not equivalent to trying to harm him.  
Fiduciary norms do not support the same conclusion. Regardless of 
whether she has attempted to harm Paul, Danielle has violated a fiduciary 
obligation to him. More generally, evidence that you have “merely” planned to 
betray someone is sufficient to establish that you are disloyal toward her. It 
does not matter whether your intention is ever manifest in behavior leading 
toward a result. Intuitively, then, having a firm plan to harm someone who has 
trusted you is not merely an attempted betrayal; it is a betrayal. Beyond these 
intuitions, the rejection of the manifestation requirement coheres with several 
structural features of fiduciary norms. For example, because of the so-called 
“prophylactic” nature of fiduciary rules against conflicts of interest, a conflict of 
interest violates the fiduciary’s duty regardless of whether it has any causal 
effect on the actions that the fiduciary takes on behalf of the beneficiary.54  
Therefore, fiduciary norms (like criminal norms, but unlike norms of 
contract and tort) are deliberation sensitive. They impose demands on both 
behavior and deliberation. Unlike criminal norms, however, fiduciary norms 
reject the manifestation requirement. Specific patterns of deliberation can 
violate fiduciary norms regardless of how (or whether) they are connected with 
behavior.  
 
52. See, e.g., JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 379 (5th ed. 2009) (contending 
that attempt liability should require the defendant to commence commission of the offense, 
since allowing liability based solely on the formation of intention is to punish someone for 
“thoughts alone”). But see Alec Walen, Criminalizing Statements of Terrorist Intent: How To 
Understand the Law Governing Terrorist Threats, and Why It Should Be Used Instead of Long-
Term Preventive Detention, 101 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 803, 853 (2011) (“[T]here is good 
reason to want the criminal law to step in and prevent the act from occurring as soon as a 
culpable act based on that intention has been performed—that is, as soon as the person has 
sincerely stated the intention.”). 
53. While there is little doubt that extant criminal norms require some manifestation of mens 
rea, there is dispute about why this requirement applies. Those who take the so-called 
“subjectivist” position deny that manifestation is necessary to establishing culpability, but 
rather see it as primarily an evidentiary requirement. See, e.g., Stephen J. Morse, Reason, 
Results, and Criminal Responsibility, 2004 U. ILL. L. REV. 363, 409. By contrast, so-called 
“objectivists” see the manifestation of mens rea as necessary for culpability. See, e.g., DUFF, 
supra note 46, at 324. Both subjectivists and objectivists recognize that the manifestation 
principle applies to criminal norms.  
54. See Irit Samet, Guarding the Fiduciary’s Conscience—a Justification of a Stringent Profit-
Stripping Rule, 28 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 763, 763-64 (2008). 
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2. Conscientiousness 
Norms have conditions of success. We use the term “compliance” to 
describe success in living up to a norm and “breach” or “violation” to describe 
failure to live up to a norm.55 There are several possible modes of complying 
with a norm. Two modes that are most relevant to our discussion are 
“following” and “conforming.”56 Someone follows a norm when she not only 
behaves or deliberates as the norm requires, but also justifies these actions by 
the fact that the norm requires these behaviors or deliberations.57 Someone 
conforms to a norm when she behaves or deliberates as the norm requires, “not 
because of the norm, but because of other considerations associated with the 
norm.”58 Following a norm is more demanding, since it imposes second-order 
standards regarding how the norm figures into one’s practical deliberation. 
Because following is so demanding, some commentators see conformity as the 
default mode of complying with a norm.59  
Different norms impose different standards for compliance. For certain 
types of norms, following is irrational or self-defeating, so conformity is the 
best (and perhaps only) way to comply.60 For other types of norms, following 
is the requisite mode of compliance.61 An agent would violate this type of norm 
if her behavior and/or deliberation matched the requirements of the norm, but 
she lacked the requisite practical orientation toward the norm. Still other types 
of norms are agnostic about compliance: conforming works just as well as 
following, and any route to compliance is just as successful as any other route.  
 
55. Our usage here mirrors that of BRENNAN ET AL., supra note 11. 
56. This distinction between following and conforming tracks the distinction that Joseph Raz 
makes between complying with and conforming to a norm. See JOSEPH RAZ, PRACTICAL 
REASON AND NORMS 178 (2d ed. 1999); see also DAVID OWENS, SHAPING THE NORMATIVE 
LANDSCAPE 15 (2012); Galoob & Leib, supra note 34; Scott Hershovitz, Legitimacy, Democracy, 
and Razian Authority, 9 LEGAL THEORY 201 (2003). 
57. BRENNAN ET AL., supra note 11, at 195. 
58. Id. at 218. 
59. See, e.g., Hershovitz, supra note 56, at 202 n.4 (citing RAZ, supra note 56, at 179-82).  
60. BRENNAN ET AL., supra note 11, at 213, 215 (concluding that “following formal norms 
(typically) involves a kind of irrationality” and “norm following does not seem to be the 
primary or paradigmatic mode of norm responsiveness in the case of moral norms”). Others 
would disagree with these contentions. See, e.g., Julia Markovits, Acting for the Right Reasons, 
119 PHIL. REV. 201 (2010). 
61. For example, in many communities, complying with the norm of spousal fidelity requires 
“following” rather than “conforming.” See Galoob & Hill, supra note 30, at 630. If a spouse 
forms the intention to cheat but chooses not to for fear of getting caught, it might be said 
that the spouse has not fully complied with this norm. 
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Fiduciary norms impose standards of compliance. Complying with the 
fiduciary duty of loyalty requires a special conscientiousness regarding the 
interests or ends of the beneficiary. Patterns of behavior or deliberation that 
lack this conscientiousness breach fiduciary norms.62 Thus, not just any token 
of conformity counts as complying with a fiduciary norm. There are many 
possible ways to describe the conscientiousness that fiduciary norms require. In 
previous works, we argued that it is impossible to act loyally by accident. If  
an agent’s behavior and/or deliberation happen to match the pattern specified 
by a fiduciary norm, but the interests or ends of the principal do not influence 
the agent’s practical deliberation in the right way, then the agent has not 
complied with the fiduciary norm.63 Paul Miller contends that all fiduciary 
norms contain a “principle of fidelity,” according to which an agent must 
“manifest [a] commitment to the fate of the purpose or person to the extent 
that same is within the control of the fiduciary in the exercise of her powers.”64 
By implication, to behave or deliberate in a way that does not manifest this 
commitment (or to lack the commitment altogether) is to breach the fiduciary 
norm. In the legal domain, the conscientiousness necessary to live up to a 
fiduciary duty is sometimes termed a requirement of “good faith.”65 Each of 
these formulations suggests that fiduciary norms are not agnostic about 
compliance: certain ways of conforming to fiduciary duties do not count as 
living up to fiduciary norms.66  
 
62. Pluralists about the requirements of loyalty can accept this conclusion while maintaining 
that the standards of conscientiousness vary across fiduciary contexts. See, e.g., SIMON 
KELLER, THE LIMITS OF LOYALTY (2007); Gold, supra note 26. 
63. See Galoob & Leib, supra note 34, at 111-15. Thus, the conscientiousness required to comply 
with fiduciary norms does not reduce to the deliberative requirements described supra 
Section I.B.1. Although both of these aspects implicate mental activity, meeting the 
deliberation requirement is a matter of assessing whether an agent engages in certain mental 
activity, while meeting the conscientiousness requirement is a matter of assessing the 
reasons why an agent engages in certain behavior or mental activity. For more on this 
distinction, see the discussion of the “Undercover Judge” case in Galoob & Hill, supra note 
30, at 631-34.  
64. Miller, supra note 36 (manuscript at 23-24). 
65. See Strine et al., supra note 33; see also Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 369 (Del. 2006) (“A 
failure to act in good faith may be shown . . . where the fiduciary intentionally acts with a 
purpose other than that of advancing the best interests of the corporation . . . or where the 
fiduciary intentionally fails to act in the face of a known duty to act, demonstrating a 
conscious disregard for his duties.” (quoting In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 
A.2d 27, 67 (Del. 2006))). 
66. Our claim here is only that fiduciary norms have standards of compliance; we do not make 
the stronger (and potentially paradoxical) claim that following is the requisite mode of 
complying with fiduciary norms.  
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By contrast, the other types of norms that we have considered so far do not 
impose standards of conscientiousness. For these norms, all modes of 
conforming are equally successful. Suppose that criminal norms prevent a 
particular course of action (Y-ing), but do not prohibit another course of action 
(X-ing). However, Adam thinks that X-ing is prohibited by criminal norms, 
and he forms and executes an elaborate plan to X. (Suppose also that Adam is 
disposed to break the law: if he knew that only Y-ing is criminally prohibited, 
he would Y.) According to the notion of “pure” legal impossibility, Adam does 
not breach any criminal norm by X-ing, even though he believes that he does.67 
Adam is an accidental complier with criminal norms because his behavior 
happens to conform to the law. Yet this happenstance is sufficient for Adam to 
live up to the criminal norm.  
Given these standards of conscientiousness, fiduciary norms are subject  
to what some philosophers call the “wrong kinds of reasons” problem.68  
This problem arises, among other places, in discussions of “fitting attitudes” 
accounts of value, which define value as that which we have reason to value. 
Some reasons to value an object have nothing to do with the object’s value. 
These are not good reasons to value an object.69 The same basic argument 
applies to a variety of attitudes and beliefs. That someone is generous is the 
right kind of reason to admire her; that her benefactor will pay me to admire 
her is the wrong kind of reason.70  
Mark Schroeder has argued that the “wrong kinds of reason” problem 
applies to any activity that is subject to standards of correctness.71 For 
Schroeder, these standards of correctness give rise to sets of reasons that are 
shared by all participants in the activity. Only the reasons within this set are 
the right kinds of reasons. Some (otherwise licit) considerations, however, 
 
67. See Ira P. Robbins, Attempting the Impossible: The Emerging Consensus, 23 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 
377, 389 (1986) (arguing that the defense of “pure” legal impossibility arises when “the law 
does not proscribe the goal that the defendant sought to achieve”).  
68. See, e.g., STEPHEN L. DARWALL, THE SECOND-PERSON STANDPOINT: MORALITY, RESPECT, 
AND ACCOUNTABILITY 15-16 (2006); Pamela Hieronymi, The Wrong Kind of Reason, 102 J. 
PHIL. 437, 437 (2005). 
69. See Wlodek Rabinowicz & Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen, Buck-Passing and the Right Kind of 
Reasons, 56 PHIL. Q. 114, 115 (2006). “Wrong kinds of reason” problems also arise in cases, 
like Pascal’s Wager, involving pragmatic, rather than evidential, reasons to believe. See 
Jonathan Way, Transmission and the Wrong Kind of Reason, 122 ETHICS 489, 490-91 (2012). 
They also arise in cases like Gregory Kavka’s toxin puzzle, see Gregory S. Kavka, The Toxin 
Puzzle, 43 ANALYSIS 33 (1983), that involve pragmatic reasons to intend to act, see Way, 
supra, at 491.  
70. See Nathaniel Sharadin, Reasons Wrong and Right, PAC. PHIL. Q. Aug. 2015, at 1, 2. 
71. See Mark Schroeder, Value and the Right Kind of Reason, 5 OXFORD STUD. METAETHICS 25, 32 
(2010). 
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might motivate performance of an action, despite being outside this shared set 
of reasons for the activity. Despite their motivational efficacy, these are 
nonetheless the wrong kinds of reasons.72  
Fiduciary norms are (by Schroeder’s logic) vulnerable to the “wrong kinds 
of reasons” problem. Illicit or inconsiderate reasons might move a fiduciary to 
behave or deliberate in the way that fiduciary norms call for. Even so, these 
patterns of behavior or deliberation would be inappropriate because they 
would be outside the set of reasons that characterize fiduciary norms. For 
example, suppose that a fiduciary and a beneficiary were both members of a 
highly demanding religion, one that requires complete devotion to the faith.73 
As a result of their common membership, the fiduciary might think about and 
act in a way that happens to advance the beneficiary’s interests or ends. If 
complying with a fiduciary norm required only that a fiduciary think about and 
advance his beneficiary’s interests or ends, then the co-religionist would live up 
to fiduciary norms. Yet, by definition, the co-religionist fiduciary is not loyal to 
the beneficiary. Rather, he is loyal to the religion, and in exhibiting this loyalty 
he happens to advance the interests or ends of the beneficiary. “That the 
beneficiary is a member of my religion” is certainly a licit reason for action, and 
it might be a powerful reason for action. Nevertheless, it is the wrong kind of 
reason for a fiduciary to be loyal to the beneficiary, at least as far as fiduciary 
norms are concerned.  
Contract, tort, and criminal norms do not require conscientiousness, nor 
do they invite the “wrong kinds of reasons” problem. Someone who refrains 
from killing another person for morally inappropriate reasons (e.g., solely 
because he does not want to risk the chance of imprisonment) has complied 
with the criminal norm against homicide. Someone who fulfills his end of an 
agreement solely out of concern for his commercial reputation has lived up to 
the contractual norm regarding performance. Someone who does not injure 
another simply because it would not be fun has not violated any norm of tort.  
In sum, fiduciary norms have standards of conscientiousness, while 
contract, tort, and criminal norms do not. Because of these standards, fiduciary 
norms invite “wrong kinds of reason” problems. 
 
72. Id. at 36-40. 
73. This example is adapted from Galoob & Leib, supra note 35, at 120-22. Our postulation that 
the religion requires complete loyalty by its adherents does not imply that we think fiduciary 
loyalty, as such, is binary (that is, all-or-nothing) or all-encompassing. We have previously 
argued that the notion of an all-encompassing loyalty is both logically and ethically 
problematic. See id. at 119-20. Furthermore, our analysis here is meant to leave open the 
possibility that loyalty is a scalar property.  
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3. Robustness  
Fiduciary norms also involve a species of what Pettit calls “robustly 
demanding” values.74 According to Pettit, someone can enjoy a robustly 
demanding value “only insofar as [he] enjoy[s] a corresponding, intuitively 
thinner benefit . . . not just actually, but across a certain range of possibilities, 
where the extent of that range determines the degree of robustness with which 
[he] enjoy[s] it.”75 For example, Pettit sees friendship as a robustly demanding 
value. In order to be someone’s friend, you must favor her “reliably or robustly, 
and not just as a contingent matter: not just as luck or chance or a spasm of 
good will would have it.”76 Someone who is there for you in good times but 
would not be there for you in bad times is not your friend. This conclusion 
holds even if times never go bad.  
The demands imposed by fiduciary norms are robust in all of these ways. 
Consider the paradigmatic fiduciary duty of loyalty. Whether an agent is loyal 
depends not only on how she acts to advance a principal’s interests or ends, but 
also on her disposition to act in circumstances where those interests or ends 
change. Part of the robustness of loyalty concerns how the beneficiary’s 
interests or ends must matter to the fiduciary. Loyalty inevitably has a 
counterfactual element: “regardless of what the beneficiary’s interests happen 
to be, if these interests were different, then the loyal fiduciary’s deliberative 
situation would be different as well.”77 If a fiduciary is disposed not to revise 
her deliberation in accordance with changes in the beneficiary’s interests or 
ends, then she is not loyal to the beneficiary.  
The robustness of the demands on fiduciaries distinguishes these types of 
norms from norms of contract and tort. For example, because harm is an 
element of tort liability, an agent (T) does not necessarily violate a norm of tort 
law in circumstances where T’s conduct does not harm a victim (V), but would 
have harmed V under alternative facts that (unbeknownst to T) do not apply. 
In other words, as discussed above, tort norms do not usually assign liability 
for what in criminal law are called impossible attempts.78 Likewise, suppose 
 
74. PETTIT, supra note 12, at 2.  
75. Id. An implication of Pettit’s definition is that the realization of a robustly demanding value 
“depends not only on what actually happens but also on what would happen in certain non-
actual circumstances.” Nicholas Southwood, Democracy as a Modally Demanding Value, 49 
NOÛS 504, 505 (2015). 
76. PETTIT, supra note 12, at 2; see also Ethan J. Leib, Friends as Fiduciaries, 86 WASH. U. L. REV. 
665 (2009) (developing an account of friendship by exploring fiduciary concepts—and vice-
versa).  
77. Galoob & Leib, supra note 34, at 116. 
78. See Robbins, supra note 67, at 388-90.  
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that A and B have a contract regarding doing X. A will not violate any 
contractual norm if she does X but would not have done Y had the contract 
concerned Y-ing.  
These conclusions are not true for fiduciary norms. Impossible attempts 
violate fiduciary norms. T would breach a fiduciary duty if he took an action 
whose purpose is to harm V, even if that action did not actually harm V. 
Likewise, A would breach fiduciary norms if she does X, but, in alternative 
circumstances in which doing Y was in B’s best interest, she would be 
committed not to do Y. Because fiduciary norms reject the manifestation 
requirement, how a fiduciary is disposed to behave or deliberate in 
nonactualized circumstances affects whether she lives up to her fiduciary 
duties.  
A more concrete illustration of the robust character of fiduciary norms can 
be derived from Henry Richardson’s discussion of the responsibilities of 
medical researchers.79 By way of background, malaria and schistosomiasis are 
both parasitic diseases that are endemic in certain parts of Africa.80 Richardson 
notes that medical researchers working in these areas “will often confirm 
malaria diagnoses by checking fluid samples under the microscope. When they 
do so, they are likely to see, and so to diagnose infection by, the schistosomiasis 
parasite as well.”81 Further, “in many of the areas where such research is carried 
out, if the participants do not receive this medical care from the researchers, 
they will not receive it at all.”82 Consider the following example:  
Case 1: As part of a public-health effort to combat malaria, Richard 
Researcher diagnoses and treats malaria in Preston Patient. Prior to 
receiving medical treatment, Preston signs a consent agreement that 
both waives his privacy rights and contains the following provision: 
“This study is only to diagnose and treat malaria.” During the study, 
Richard diagnoses Preston with schistosomiasis but does not convey 
this information to Preston or treat the disease. 
The discovery of schistosomiasis in this example is what bioethicists call an 
“incidental finding,” or a “finding concerning an individual research 
participant that has potential health or reproductive importance and is 
discovered in the course of conducting research but is beyond the aims of the 
 
79. See HENRY S. RICHARDSON, MORAL ENTANGLEMENTS: THE ANCILLARY-CARE OBLIGATIONS 
OF MEDICAL RESEARCHERS (2012). 
80. See id. at 4. 
81. Id.  
82. Id.  
 fiduciary political theory: a critique 
1841 
 
study.”83 Does Richard have a responsibility to convey these incidental findings 
to Preston, or to provide him with what Richardson calls “ancillary care” (that 
is, “medical care that . . . research subjects need but that is not required to 
make a study scientifically valid, to ensure a study’s safety, or to redress 
research injuries”)?84  
Suppose that tort, contract, and fiduciary norms all apply to Richard in 
Case 1. It is unclear whether Richard’s actions would violate extant tort norms. 
The answer to this question depends on contingent facts about whether 
conveying incidental findings and providing ancillary care are part of the 
relevant standard of care, which in turn depends on how other medical 
researchers would have behaved in these circumstances.85 Likewise, Richard’s 
actions in Case 1 would probably not breach generally applicable norms of 
contract, since the disclaimer in the consent agreement is likely sufficient to 
relieve Richard of any responsibility for diagnosing or treating Preston’s 
schistosomiasis.  
In contrast, Richard’s conduct would violate fiduciary norms. Richardson 
concludes that medical researchers have a general duty to warn and to treat in 
circumstances like Case 1, and his argument for that conclusion closely 
resembles an application of fiduciary principles. For Richardson, the medical 
researcher’s ancillary-care duties arise from the subject’s waiver of privacy 
rights. The volitional exercise involved in this waiver creates what Richardson 
calls a “moral entanglement,” whereby “special obligations unintendedly arise 
in a way that is ancillary to some other moral transaction.”86 However, the 
waiver does not fully explain the duties that attach to this relationship. 
According to Richardson, “The initial, mutually voluntary establishment of a 
privacy waiver—often a one-sided one—sets up a basic voluntary assumption 
of responsibility, one that potentially makes certain vulnerabilities of the 
 
83. Susan M. Wolf et al., Managing Incidental Findings in Human Subjects Research: Analysis and 
Recommendations, 36 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 219, 219 (2008). 
84. RICHARDSON, supra note 79, at 2-3.  
85. See Elizabeth R. Pike et al., Finding Fault? Exploring Legal Duties To Return Incidental 
Findings in Genomic Research, 102 GEO. L.J. 795, 798 (2014) (noting that although there is no 
“case law directly on point,” there is a “small possibility” that researchers may be legally 
obligated to return incidental findings because “tort law duties are determined by the 
prevailing standard of care” and consequently “recognition by scholars and the research 
community of an ethical obligation to return [incidental findings] could ultimately lead to a 
legal obligation”); cf. Susan M. Wolf et al., The Law of Incidental Findings in Human Subjects 
Research: Establishing Researchers’ Duties, 36 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 361, 362 (2008) (contending 
that existing tort norms support the conclusion that medical researchers have legal duties to 
convey incidental findings to study participants). 
86. RICHARDSON, supra note 79, at 65.  
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offeror of special moral concern to the accepter.”87 This special moral concern, 
in turn, creates special responsibilities for a researcher (and for moral agents 
generally):  
Once one has warned the other about a new problem that one discovers 
on the basis of private information (or has otherwise broached the 
issue), the morally best way to address these underlying concerns 
becomes not to duck out, but rather to help the other address the 
problem—assuming the other wants help. In this way, the duty to warn 
(or its cognates) further deepens the incipient relationship begun by the 
initial intimacy, providing a clear locus for a special obligation of 
beneficence.88 
In contrast with norms of promise and contract, under which someone’s 
obligations are “largely under the control of [her] will[],” entanglements like 
those involved in Case 1 “can extend our obligations in ways that we do not 
intend or foresee” because the researcher’s responsibilities to the subject 
“morph when one has warned the other about a danger discovered on the basis 
of private information.”89  
 Fiduciary responsibilities have exactly the “morphing” quality that 
Richardson attributes to entanglement-based responsibilities. Indeed, many 
commentators identify something like this “morphing” quality in describing 
fiduciary duties as “open-ended.”90 A fiduciary violates her responsibilities 
when, in light of changed circumstances, she fails to alter her behavior or 
deliberation in the way that is required to fulfill her mandate.91 In Case 1, then, 
 
87. Id. at 85. 
88. Id. at 95-96. 
89. Id. at 106. 
90. See, e.g., Robert C. Clark, Agency Costs Versus Fiduciary Duties, in PRINCIPALS AND AGENTS: 
THE STRUCTURE OF BUSINESS 55, 71-76 (John Pratt & Richard Zeckhauser eds., 1985); 
Robert Cooter & Bradley J. Freedman, The Fiduciary Relationship: Its Economic Character and 
Legal Consequences, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1045, 1049 (1991). 
91. To provide a real-world example of this effect, consider the conduct of the Vinson & Elkins 
(V&E) law firm in connection with the collapse of Enron. In that case, Sharon Watkins 
alleged that Enron had (with Arthur Andersen’s help) manufactured special-purpose 
entities to keep debt off of Enron’s books, thus inflating the company’s earnings. Lawyers 
from V&E were engaged to look into the underlying transactions but were specifically 
instructed not to investigate Andersen’s treatment of them. V&E lawyers “reported back that 
the transactions looked fine because the accountants had signed off on them.” Rebecca 
Roiphe, The Ethics of Willful Ignorance, 24 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 187, 189 (2011). Some 
commentators contend that this pattern of investigating “[w]ith blinders on” violated 
norms prohibiting lawyers from assisting in crimes or frauds. Id.; see also William H. Simon, 
Wrongs of Ignorance and Ambiguity: Lawyer Responsibility for Collective Misconduct, 22 YALE J. 
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fiduciary norms would impose responsibilities to convey incidental findings 
and provide ancillary care beyond those contemplated in the initial agreement. 
By contrast, responsibilities arising under contract and tort do not necessarily 
“morph” in this way.  
The following example suggests another way that fiduciary norms are 
robustly demanding:  
Case 2: As part of the same public-health effort in Case 1, Rhonda 
Researcher diagnoses and treats malaria in Pauline Patient. Rhonda 
could easily determine whether Pauline is infected with 
schistosomiasis; however, doing so would trigger ancillary-care 
responsibilities that Rhonda does not want to undertake. Therefore, 
Rhonda does not investigate whether Pauline’s sample is infected with 
schistosomiasis, nor does she provide treatment for this disease. 
We think that norms of tort and contract reach the same conclusions in Case 2 
as in Case 1. Because these types of norms do not (or, in the case of tort norms, 
do not necessarily) impose ancillary-care responsibilities, they do not 
necessarily impose any duty to seek out incidental findings or to investigate 
whether ancillary care is needed.  
But if fiduciary norms applied, then Rhonda’s actions in Case 2 would 
likely violate them. The best explanation for this conclusion is that fiduciary 
norms not only impose responsibilities that “morph” but also (in light of these 
responsibilities) impose responsibilities to determine whether some morphing 
of responsibilities is called for in order to further the beneficiary’s interests or 
ends. We call this further responsibility an updating requirement. As part of this 
requirement, fiduciary norms demand that the fiduciary investigate changes in 
the beneficiary’s interest or ends. They also demand sensitivity to the results of 
the investigation: the fiduciary must be committed to revising her efforts on 
behalf of the beneficiary in light of changes to the beneficiary’s interests or 
ends. A failure to update in either of these respects (through, for example, a 
failure to investigate or an unwillingness to revise) is sufficient to violate 
fiduciary norms.  
Our statement of the updating requirement so far has been abstract. The 
requirement is likely to be instantiated differently in different fiduciary 
contexts. For example, an attorney owes fiduciary duties to her client, part of 
which includes the duty to investigate matters that might advance the client’s 
legal interests. Although the rules regarding this duty are complex, at least 
 
ON REG. 1, 27 (2005). Our argument is that the blinkered scope of the investigation and the 
decision not to convey its fruits was a failure of updating and therefore a violation of the 
fiduciary duty that V&E lawyers owed to the corporate client. 
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some failures to investigate matters that would advance the client’s interests are 
violations of the lawyer’s fiduciary duty.92 Moreover, although the contours of 
the investigative duty differ depending on the context, the sensitivity 
requirement presumably does not. The fiduciary duty of loyalty would be 
breached if a fiduciary “adopt[ed] a[n] ‘[I] don’t care about the risks’ attitude” 
concerning a decision regarding the interests or ends of the beneficiary.93 A 
lawyer’s insensitivity to the fruits of investigation thus violates fiduciary norms 
because it amounts to an “I don’t care about the risks” approach to lawyering.  
The application of this updating requirement further distinguishes 
fiduciary norms from other types of legal norms. Criminal norms impose no 
updating requirements: in order to comply with criminal law, one must only 
abide by the criminal norms that exist, rather than the ones that might exist. 
No citizen has a duty to investigate which criminal prohibitions would best 
serve the public interest or a duty to abide by criminal prohibitions that have 
not been formally enacted. Indeed, imposing such an updating requirement for 
criminal norms would be inconsistent with basic values of legality.94 Nor  
do contractual norms impose default updating requirements. Once an 
agreement is made, a party has no automatic duty to monitor changes to the 
counterparty’s interests or to unilaterally revise the terms of the agreement if 
doing so would advance the counterparty’s interests.95  
Thus, fiduciary norms impose robust demands on agents. Unlike other 
types of legal norms, the requirements imposed by fiduciary norms necessarily 
“morph.” Among the demands unique to fiduciary norms is an updating 
requirement: the fiduciary must not only monitor changes in the beneficiary’s 
interests or ends but also modify her actions on behalf of the beneficiary as a 
result of these investigations.  
 
92. For example, under the U.S. Supreme Court’s definition of ineffective assistance of counsel, 
some failures by an attorney to investigate claims or defenses that would advance the client’s 
legal interests violate the attorney’s fiduciary duties, see Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 510-
13 (2003), although others (especially those failures that are attributable to a strategic 
decision by the attorney) do not, see Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 699 (1984).  
93. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 825 A.2d 275, 289 (Del. Ch. 2003).  
94. See HERBERT L. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 79-80 (1968) (contending 
that the principle of legality, namely that criminally prohibited acts be explicitly defined as 
such in advance of their application, is “the first principle” of criminal law).  
95. An exception to this rule might be the norms of relational contracts. For some investigation 
into the ethics of relational contracting, see Ethan J. Leib, Contracts and Friendships, 59 
EMORY L.J. 649 (2010).  
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i i .  testing fiduciary political  theory:  three case studies  
To summarize the analysis set forth above, here is our framework for 
determining when fiduciary political theory is likely to work: because fiduciary 
norms are deliberation sensitive, have standards of conscientiousness, and 
impose robust demands, fiduciary political theory will only be capable of 
illuminating domains of public law where these features are at home. We use 
this framework to show how some efforts at fiduciary political theory 
illuminate, others appear to be incomplete, and still others are subject to 
criticism.  
Toward this end, we consider three examples of fiduciary political theory: a 
fiduciary theory of judging advanced by Ethan Leib, David Ponet, and Michael 
Serota (Section II.A); a fiduciary theory of administrative governance 
articulated by Evan Criddle (Section II.B); and a fiduciary theory of 
international law defended by Criddle and Evan Fox-Decent (Section II.C). 
We mean these discussions to be case studies, rather than definitive 
engagements. Thus, we consider only the versions of these theories advanced 
by their authors, rather than all existing or possible versions. Our primary goal 
is neither to vindicate nor to condemn the substance of these particular 
theories.96 Rather, we aim to demonstrate whether any fiduciary theory is 
likely to be fruitful in these domains of public law.  
To preview our conclusions, fiduciary theories of judging are capable of 
explaining important aspects of the judicial role that prominent alternative 
theories (like those advanced by Ronald Dworkin and Richard Posner) cannot 
easily explain. Fiduciary theories of administrative governance are intriguing, 
but they rest on premises that are largely undefended and would almost 
certainly be denied by those (e.g., consequentialists and pragmatists like 
Adrian Vermeule) who are most likely to reject fiduciary political theorizing. 
Finally, the domain of international law seems to us incompatible with several 
features of fiduciary norms. This incompatibility calls into question the 
viability of fiduciary political theory about international law, at least as that 
domain of law currently exists. 
 
96. As such, we do not offer or address potential substantive criticisms of these theories, such as 
their specifications of who is the beneficiary or their descriptions of what the fiduciary owes 
to the beneficiary. On the complexities associated with figuring out who the relevant 
beneficiaries are in these theories, see Ethan J. Leib, David L. Ponet & Michael Serota, 
Mapping Public Fiduciary Relationships, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF FIDUCIARY LAW, 
supra note 6, at 388, 395-403.  
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A. A Fiduciary Theory of Judging 
A theory of judging establishes how “judges [should] decide the 
controversies that are presented to them.”97 The fiduciary theory of judging 
advanced by Leib, Ponet, and Serota (LPS) contends that every judge has 
fiduciary obligations to the people who are bound by the law that the judge 
interprets and applies.98 LPS construe fiduciary norms as applying to any 
context in which “one person . . . has discretionary power over the assets or 
legal interests of another,” such that the legal interests of the latter are 
vulnerable to the discretionary decisions of the former.99 According to LPS, 
each of the indicia of fiduciary norms is realized in the judicial role: judges 
maintain wide discretionary authority over those who are subject to the law,100 
judges are entrusted by those who are subject to the law with the authority to 
interpret it,101 and “the delegation to judges of substantial legal authority to 
apply or interpret the law leaves citizens vulnerable.”102 Therefore, LPS 
contend, fiduciary norms apply to judges.103 As such, judges owe “the 
people”—their putative beneficiary class—a duty of loyalty (a responsibility to 
be impartial toward the litigants in resolving a case),104 a duty of care (which 
requires the exercise of competence in saying what the law is and providing 
 
97. Lawrence B. Solum, Virtue Jurisprudence: A Virtue-Centered Theory of Judging, 34 
METAPHILOSOPHY 178, 182 (2003). 
98. Leib, Ponet & Serota, supra note 13. Others have criticized the way that LPS specify the 
beneficiary of the fiduciary theory of judging. See Paul B. Miller & Andrew S. Gold, 
Fiduciary Governance, 57 WM. & MARY L. REV. 513, 568 (2015) (“While the notion that judges 
are fiduciaries of the people is intuitively appealing, it is also overly vague. Who constitutes 
‘the people’ remains unclear. ‘The people’ could include the people in the state, district, or 
circuit over which a judge has jurisdiction; it could include all American citizens; it might 
include non-citizens in cases that implicate their interests; it might even include future 
generations.”). However, as discussed supra note 96 and accompanying text, we abstract 
away from this and other substantive debates among fiduciary theorists.  
99. Leib, Ponet & Serota, supra note 13, at 705. LPS acknowledge that the stringency with which 
fiduciary norms apply “shifts as the[] indicia [of discretion, vulnerability, and trust] register 
at different intensities across the varied landscape of” fiduciary relationships. Id. at 707.  
100. See id. at 718.  
101. See id.  
102. Id. at 719.  
103. In addition to their analysis of discretion, vulnerability, and trust, LPS make a parallel 
historical argument that seeing judges as fiduciaries is consistent with the understanding of 
the framers of the U.S. Constitution, who saw judges as “agents and trustees of the people.” 
Id. at 714-17.  
104. See id. at 731-33.  
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reasons for decisions),105 and a separate duty of candor (which “instructs that 
judges should say what they mean”).106 Consistent with the fiduciary theory of 
judging, the basic norms for judges impose each of these duties.107  
From this brief sketch, it is possible to contrast fiduciary theories of 
judging with two prominent alternatives.108 An interpretivist theory like 
Ronald Dworkin’s “law as integrity” view grounds the judge’s role-based 
responsibilities on free-floating commitments to certain ideals.109 In Dworkin’s 
view, a judge should resolve cases based on morally weighty principles that fit 
(or explain) a sufficient number of existing legal materials. Dworkin’s theory of 
law holds that there is a right answer to hard legal questions,110 and “law as 
integrity” is an adjudicative methodology that allows the judge to reach this 
right answer.111 Dworkin concedes that his view is consequentialist in the sense 
 
105. See id. at 736-38.  
106. See id. at 738-40.  
107. See id. at 730-40.  
108. There are a variety of other theories of judging that we do not consider here. For example, 
we ignore accounts of judging that take as their point of departure the claim that judges 
decide cases only to comport with their political views, or that judicial decision making is 
wholly indeterminate, reflecting what judges eat for breakfast. Whatever else one can say 
about the “legal realist” or “critical legal studies” views of judging, they do not address the 
normative questions of when and how judges ought to decide cases. 
109. See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 263 (1986) (“The spirit of integrity, which we 
located in fraternity, would be outraged if Hercules were to make his decision in any way 
other than by choosing the interpretation that he believes best from the standpoint of 
political morality as a whole.”). 
110. See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY ch. 13 (1978) [hereinafter 
DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY]; Ronald Dworkin, No Right Answer?, 53 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 1 (1978). 
111. Dworkin allows that there are various routes by which a judge may reach the correct 
decision, as specified by the “law as integrity” method. For example, a judge may reason 
consciously (like the ideal judge Hercules) or unconsciously. See DWORKIN, supra note 109, 
at 245. Dworkin also concedes that the reasoning process of Hercules need not be employed 
in the disposition of “easy cases,” since “we need not ask questions when we already know 
the answer.” Id. at 266; see also DWORKIN, supra note 16, at 56 (noting that the interpretive 
account of legal reasoning “is not automatically an argument about the responsibilities of 
judges in ordinary cases or even in constitutional cases”).  
Dworkin can also be read to assert that deliberative requirements flow from an 
underlying commitment to integrity and thus bind judges in all cases. See, e.g., DWORKIN, 
supra note 109, at 217 (contending that “integrity in adjudication” requires judges “so far as 
this is possible, to treat our present system of public standards as expressing and respecting 
a coherent set of principles, and, to that end, to interpret these standards to find implicit 
standards between and beneath the explicit ones” (emphasis added)). We think that this 
deliberative requirement is best seen as a unique feature of Hercules, one that does not 
generalize to mere mortal judges. However, a version of Dworkin’s theory that imposed 
deliberative requirements on judges regarding both matters of principle and matters of 
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that “each interpretive legal argument is aimed to secure a state of affairs that is 
superior, according to principles embedded in our practice, to alternatives.”112 
The “law as integrity” view is thus, in Lawrence Solum’s phrase, “outcome-
centered”; whether a judge has acted with integrity is determined by whether 
she reaches the correct resolution of the case before her.113  
Another prominent theory of judging is the pragmatic theory of 
adjudication defended by, among others, Richard Posner. For Posner, legal 
pragmatism is, roughly, “a heightened concern with consequences or . . . ‘a 
disposition to ground policy judgments on facts and consequences rather than 
on conceptualisms and generalities.’”114 Posner contends that a judge should 
engage in pragmatic adjudication by “always tr[ying] to do the best he can do 
for the present and the future, unchecked by any felt duty to secure consistency 
in principle with what other officials have done in the past.”115 Pragmatic 
adjudication is outcome-centered in the same way that “law as integrity” is. 
Posner envisions a two-step process of judicial interpretation in which the 
judge first “infer[s] a purpose from the language and context” of the legal text 
or body of law, then “decide[s] what outcome in the case at hand would serve 
that purpose best.”116 For Posner, the outcome is what matters fundamentally; 
the judge’s reasoning is relevant only insofar as it is a reliable or useful guide  
to securing the best outcome.117 There is, Posner says, “no intrinsic or 
fundamental difference between how a judge approaches a legal problem and 
how a businessman approaches a problem of production or marketing.”118  
The fiduciary theory seems better suited than these alternatives to explain 
the features of the norms for judges (including duties regarding loyalty, care, 
and candor) that LPS identify. However, assume for the sake of argument that 
 
policy would resemble the fiduciary theory along this dimension. Thanks to Bill Simon and 
Ben Zipursky for encouraging us to consider the common ground between Dworkin’s 
theory and fiduciary theories.  
112. DWORKIN, supra note 16, at 61. 
113. Solum, supra note 97, at 184 (contending that the “law as integrity” view “begins with the 
criteria for good decisions and then constructs the ideal judge who is able to render such 
decisions”). 
114. POSNER, supra note 17, at 59 (quoting RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMATICS OF MORAL 
AND LEGAL THEORY 227 (1999)).  
115. Richard A. Posner, Pragmatic Adjudication, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 4 (1996). 
116. POSNER, supra note 17, at 67.  
117. Indeed, Posner conjectures that a system in which judges agreed on outcomes but disagreed 
about “premises of fact and value” would have enhanced legitimacy. Id. at 120. 
118. Id. at 73. As this passage might indicate, it is not clear whether Posner aims for his theory to 
capture the way that lay people (or judges, for that matter) understand the norms for 
judges.  
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both “law as integrity” and pragmatic adjudication could explain these basic 
tenets.119 In what follows, we argue that the norms for judges have each of the 
structural characteristics of fiduciary norms: they are deliberation sensitive 
(Section II.A.1), they impose standards of conscientiousness (Section II.A.2), 
and they apply robustly (Section II.A.3). Each of these features is widely 
recognized as an aspect of the norms for judges. Indeed, these features are 
perhaps so obvious as to be taken for granted. It would be difficult to imagine a 
judiciary worth having in which the norms for judges lacked any of these 
features. While outcome-centered alternatives (like those proposed by 
Dworkin and Posner) cannot easily accommodate these features, the fiduciary 
theory of judging can.  
1. Are the Norms for Judges Deliberation Sensitive?  
Yes. The norms for judges directly impose requirements on how judges 
deliberate. For example, Rule 2.2 of the American Bar Association’s Model Code 
of Judicial Conduct stipulates that a judge must “uphold and apply the law” and 
“perform all duties of judicial office fairly and impartially.”120 Impartiality, in 
turn, requires the judge to be “objective and open-minded.”121 A judge whose 
deliberation failed to be objective or who was not open-minded would violate 
this norm, regardless of how she resolved the cases before her. Moreover, a 
judge can breach the norms for judges by failing to live up to her deliberative 
responsibilities, regardless of whether this failure is manifest in her behavior. 
Existing statements of the norms for judges, particularly the prophylactic 
nature of the rules regarding conflicts of interest and prohibitions on ex parte 
contacts,122 reflect this possibility. It is also demonstrated by the following 
scenario:  
 
119. Dworkin might explain that the duties of loyalty, care, and candor are entailed by the values 
of “legality and the rule of law.” DWORKIN, supra note 16, at 13. A pragmatist might justify 
these duties on the grounds that they systematically promote better case outcomes.  
120. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 2 r. 2.2 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2011). 
121. Id. at Canon 2 r. 2.2 cmt. 1. 
122. See id. at Canon 2 r. 2.4(B) (“A judge shall not permit family, social, political, financial, or 
other interests or relationships to influence the judge’s judicial conduct or judgment.”); id. 
at Canon 2 r. 2.9(A) (prohibiting, with minor exceptions, “ex parte communications, or 
consider[ation of] other communications made to the judge outside the presence of the 
parties or their lawyers”).  
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Conspiring Judges123: Donor makes a $1,000 campaign contribution 
to Judge Rivers. Judge Rivers tells Donor, “You run into a problem 
with any of your people, you get ahold of me. Anything you need.” 
Khan is a defendant in a firearm possession case before Judge 
Seagull. Donor tells Judge Rivers that Khan is one of her people and 
asks for his help.  
Judge Rivers calls Judge Seagull and tells her that Khan is one of his 
friends. Judge Rivers asks Judge Seagull to “help” Khan, to which 
Judge Seagull replies, “Okay.” When Khan appears in Judge Seagull’s 
court several months later, she reduces the charges against him to a 
misdemeanor. Judge Seagull never takes anything from Judge Rivers.  
We think that Judge Seagull violates a fiduciary norm in Conspiring 
Judges. This conclusion holds even if the decision to reduce the charges against 
Khan is socially optimal or consistent with existing legal materials. Likewise, 
Judge Seagull’s actions violate the norms for judges even if she would have 
reduced the charges without Judge Rivers’s exhortation, or if she never actually 
enters the order reducing the charges against Khan. Judge Seagull’s agreement 
with Judge Rivers is, at the very least, a violation of the deliberative norm 
requiring objectiveness and open-mindedness. These conclusions do not 
depend on how or whether Judge Seagull’s commitments are manifest in her 
behavior. Thus, the norms for judges appear to be sensitive to deliberation in 
the same way as fiduciary norms.  
By contrast, neither Dworkin’s “law as integrity” view nor Posner’s 
pragmatic adjudication view can explain these results. On both theories, if the 
outcome of Judge Seagull’s decision is correct (that is, if it is the morally best 
interpretation of the extant legal materials or tends to produce socially optimal 
results), then she lives up to the norms for judges. In other words, both 
theories would attribute only derivative relevance to Judge Seagull’s 
deliberation: her deliberative process would matter only if she had not reached 
the correct decision.124 The problem with these alternative theories, then, is 
their outcome centrism. The norms for judges clearly impose requirements 
regarding outcomes. Conspiring Judges illustrates that these norms also 
 
123. This example is a fictionalized version of the one described in Jeremy Roebuck et al., 
“Anything You Need”: How Case Against Judge Waters Was Built, PHILLY NEWS (Sept. 26, 
2014), http://articles.philly.com/2014-09-26/news/54322553_1_pennsylvania-supreme-court 
-waters-jr-municipal-court-bench [http://perma.cc/67M6-H2CL].  
124. For example, both Dworkin and Posner allow that the propriety of a judicial decision can be 
evaluated independently of an evaluation of a judge’s conscious deliberation. DWORKIN, 
supra note 109, at 245; POSNER, supra note 17, at 269.  
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impose freestanding deliberative requirements. Among the three theories of 
judging considered here, only the fiduciary theory captures this nuance.  
2. Do the Norms for Judges Impose Standards of Conscientiousness?  
Here, too, an affirmative answer seems clear. Not just any way of satisfying 
the behavioral or deliberative requirements of norms for judges will count as 
compliance. For example, Canon 1 of the Model Code of Judicial Conduct 
instructs that a judge must “uphold and promote the independence, integrity, 
and impartiality of the judiciary, and . . . avoid impropriety and the appearance 
of impropriety.”125 A judge whose actions have the tendency to promote the 
“independence, integrity, and impartiality of the judiciary” but who 
nonetheless fails to “uphold” these values would therefore fail to comply with 
this norm.  
Another way to appreciate that the norms for judges impose standards of 
conscientiousness is to note that these norms, like fiduciary norms, are subject 
to “wrong kinds of reasons” problems. The Conspiring Judges scenario 
demonstrates this susceptibility. In that case, Judge Rivers asks Judge Seagull 
to reduce the charge against Khan. That your fellow judge asks you to reduce 
the charge can be a powerful reason to do so. However, this consideration is 
not within the shared set of reasons applicable to legal officials. It is, therefore, 
the wrong kind of reason for reducing the charge. In acting on it, Judge Seagull 
violates the norms for judges.  
The alternative theories of judging fail to appreciate the conscientiousness 
standards implicit in the norms for judges. In the terms we introduced in 
Section I.B.2, pragmatic adjudication is generally agnostic about compliance. 
To the extent that outcomes are what matter fundamentally, any way that a 
judge reaches the correct decision is, in principle, as good as any other way. 
Posner’s agnosticism is both explicit and general: on his view, “[h]ow the 
judge arrives at his decision is . . . a ‘meta-legal’ question without interest” in 
establishing whether a judge has done his job.126  
 
125. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2011). 
126. POSNER, supra note 17, at 267 (quoting LON L. FULLER, THE LAW IN QUEST OF ITSELF 89 
(1940)). Although this quotation concerns Lon Fuller’s criticism of Hans Kelsen’s theory of 
the judicial role, it also describes Posner’s pragmatist view. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, 
HOW JUDGES THINK 111 (2008) (“The published opinion often conceals the true reasons for 
a judicial decision by leaving them buried in the judicial unconscious. Had the intuitive 
judgment that underlies the decision been different, perhaps an equally plausible opinion in 
support of it could have been written. If so, the reasoning in the opinion is not the real cause 
of the decision, but a rationalization.”). 
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Dworkin’s view is also agnostic regarding much of the judge’s role, 
although this agnosticism is less explicit and more cabined. Dworkin’s position 
would allow that integrity imposes compliance standards (and invites “wrong 
kinds of reasons” problems), but only regarding what Dworkin calls “matters 
of principle,” or standards that are to be observed as basic “requirement[s] of 
justice or fairness or some other dimension of [political] morality.”127 By 
contrast, matters of policy, which set out “a goal to be reached, generally an 
improvement in some economic, political or social feature of the 
community,”128 do not call integrity into question and therefore do not impose 
standards of compliance.129 How the “law as integrity” theory would analyze 
the Conspiring Judges case depends on whether classifying criminal charges as 
a misdemeanor or felony is a matter of principle or a matter of policy. The 
latter classification seems better supported by Dworkin’s description of his 
view.130 If so, then the “law as integrity” theory would conclude that there are 
no conscientiousness standards for this aspect of the judge’s role, and that 
“wrong kinds of reasons” problems are inapplicable in this case.  
To summarize, the norms for judges impose standards of 
conscientiousness. The fiduciary theory can explain these standards while 
alternative views cannot do so easily, if at all.  
3. Are the Norms for Judges Robust?  
The norms for judges are also robust, in both the “morphing” and 
“updating” senses described in Section I.B.3. The morphing quality of these 
norms is captured by the widely acknowledged notion that judicial 
responsibilities are open-ended.131 The “updating” quality of these norms is 
 
127. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, supra note 110, at 22.  
128. Id.  
129. See DWORKIN, supra note 109, at 223 (“Integrity’s effect on decisions of policy . . . 
requires . . . that government pursue some coherent conception of what treating people as 
equals means, but this is mainly a question of general strategies and rough statistical tests. It 
does not otherwise require narrow consistency within policies: it does not require that 
particular programs treat everyone the same way.”). 
130. For example, Dworkin concedes that decisions to prosecute crimes are matters of policy and 
therefore do not implicate the value of integrity. Id. at 224 (“If a prosecutor’s reason for not 
prosecuting one person lies in policy . . . [then] integrity offers no reason why someone else 
should not be prosecuted when these reasons of policy are absent or reversed.”). If 
Dworkin’s view were revised such that the value of integrity were implicated by both 
matters of principle and matters of policy, then it would resemble the proceduralism of the 
fiduciary theory. 
131. See, e.g., Timothy Endicott, Habeas Corpus and Guantánamo Bay: A View from Abroad, 54 AM. 
J. JURIS. 1, 14 (2009) (noting that the judicial power, under habeas corpus, to “dispose of 
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evidenced in the idea that a judge’s decisions must be sensitive to new 
information. There are, of course, limits to (and debates about) the kinds of 
updating that judges must or may do. To wit, Rule 2.9(c) of the Model Code of 
Judicial Conduct states that a “judge shall not investigate facts in a matter 
independently, and shall consider only the evidence presented and any facts 
that may properly be judicially noticed.”132 Whatever the proper scope of 
judicial updating, however, it seems obvious that a judge can be required to 
conduct some sort of due diligence as part of the fulfillment of her official 
duties. The fiduciary theory of judging captures this requirement, although so 
can Dworkin’s and Posner’s theories. 
However, appreciating the sensitivity of the norms for judges affords 
another way to appreciate what goes wrong in Conspiring Judges. To the 
charge that she has violated the norms for judges, Judge Seagull might respond 
that she resolved the case before her in exactly the way that a norm-abiding 
judge would have. Regardless of whether the decision was correct, however, 
Judge Seagull’s decision procedure was problematic because it was insensitive 
to the facts of the case, the content of the law, and the interests of the public. In 
other words, Judge Seagull would have decided the case in Khan’s favor 
regardless of the legal merits of his position; that the legal merits supported 
her decision was a happy accident. If the circumstances had been only slightly 
different—if, for example, Judge Rivers had asked Judge Seagull to increase the 
charges against Khan as a favor to his contributor—then this decision 
procedure would have yielded the wrong answer. Living up to the norms for 
judges requires more than that a judge’s decision have legal bases. In addition, 
the connection between these legal bases and the decision must be intentional. 
Both “law as integrity” and pragmatism can explain some of the ways in 
which the norms for judges are robust. In particular, both approaches can 
appreciate how the requirements incumbent on a judge morph based on 
changes in circumstances.133 However, because these views are outcome 
 
matter[s] as law and justice require” is an “open-ended” standard that “leaves it to the 
judges to elaborate their own responsibility”).  
132. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 2 r. 2.9(C) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2011). Indeed, the 
appendices to Judge Posner’s majority opinion and Judge Hamilton’s dissent in Rowe v. 
Gibson illustrate contrasting positions about the extent to which judges should seek out 
information that is relevant to a decision, but that was not presented by the parties to a 
dispute. See Rowe v. Gibson, 798 F.3d 622, 632-44 (7th Cir. 2015). 
133. See DWORKIN, supra note 109, at 348 (“[The ideal judge] interprets not just [a] statute’s text 
but its life, the process that begins before it becomes law and extends far beyond that 
moment. He aims to make the best he can of this continuing story, and his interpretation 
therefore changes as the story develops.”); Posner, supra note 115, at 11-12 (“[A]t their best, 
American appellate courts are councils of wise elders and it is not completely insane to 
entrust them with responsibility for deciding cases in a way that will produce the best 
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centered, they cannot fully capture the updating requirement. In particular, 
they cannot easily condemn decisions made according to insensitive procedures 
that happen to succeed. Neither can they explain why the lucky success 
exhibited in Conspiring Judges is deficient. Fiduciary theory, on the other 
hand, can straightforwardly explain that an insensitive decision procedure is 
problematic because it exhibits neither the conscientiousness nor robustness 
that loyalty requires. 
 
*** 
 
Thus, fiduciary political theory seems to illuminate the domain of judging. 
As articulated by LPS, the fiduciary theory of judging captures important 
aspects of the norms for judges that prominent alternative theories cannot 
easily explain. This is not to say that the fiduciary theory fully describes the 
normative constraints on judges, or that no version of the alternative theories 
could account for the core of the norms for judges.134 Rather, our claim here is 
that norms for judges are deliberation sensitive, impose standards of 
conscientiousness, and operate robustly. A theory of judging is incomplete if it 
neglects these features, and the fiduciary theory provides a straightforward way 
to both explain and justify them.  
B. A Fiduciary Theory of Administrative Governance 
A theory of administrative governance provides standards for determining 
how governance by administrative institutions can (or cannot) be politically 
legitimate.135 Evan Criddle has offered the clearest interpretation of a fiduciary 
theory of administrative governance, as well as a fiduciary theory of 
administrative rulemaking (that is, how agencies should make rules to 
 
results in the circumstances rather than just deciding cases in accordance with rules created 
by other organs of government or in accordance with their own previous decisions . . . .”). 
134. For example, it seems possible that both “law as integrity” and pragmatic approaches could 
be reconfigured in ways that would make them compatible with the fiduciary theory. If so, 
then the fiduciary theory of judging might best be seen as supplementing outcome-centered 
approaches like those championed by Dworkin and Posner.  
135. See, e.g., HENRY S. RICHARDSON, DEMOCRATIC AUTONOMY: PUBLIC REASONING ABOUT THE 
ENDS OF POLICY 7 (2002) (“Some considerable administrative discretion is not only 
inevitable but also . . . to be welcomed. Democratic theory, therefore, must face up to this 
fact by considering how bureaucratic domination can be avoided and whether this sort of 
discretion is compatible with rule by the people.”); Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of 
American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1667 (1975). 
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implement legislation).136 According to Criddle, fiduciary norms arise in all 
circumstances where an entrustment by a beneficiary leads to “substitution” 
(whereby an agent stands in as a steward “with discretion over an aspect of” 
the principal’s welfare)137 and “residual control” by the principal (who, “even 
after” entrustment, “reserve[s] the right to supervise fiduciary performance 
and, in appropriate circumstances, to take corrective action to remedy fiduciary 
malfeasance”).138 These circumstances create the need for fiduciary duties, 
which provide standards for determining that the agent’s “broad latitude to set 
discretionary policies . . . do[es] not transgress reasonable limits.”139 More 
broadly, Criddle argues that, whenever substitutional entrustment arises, 
fiduciary norms are necessary to prevent the principal from being dominated 
by the agent.140 For Criddle, whenever fiduciary norms apply, an agent is 
required to act both deliberately and deliberatively in order to advance the 
principal’s interests.141 
Criddle contends that administrative governance exhibits each of  
the hallmarks of fiduciary norms. Because “the people as a whole”  
entrust authority to administrative institutions, these institutions “serve  
as stewards for the people.”142 Administrative agencies and public officials  
are therefore charged with advancing the interests of the people as a whole  
and are constrained by duties of loyalty and care that are owed to the 
populace.143 On Criddle’s logic, fiduciary norms apply to exercises of 
administrative rulemaking144 and adjudication,145 and more broadly to the 
structure of administrative institutions146 and the role-based responsibilities of 
administrators.147 The fiduciary theory thus supposes that administrative-
 
136. See Criddle, Fiduciary Administration, supra note 7; Criddle, Fiduciary Foundations, supra note 
7; Criddle, Mending Holes, supra note 7. 
137. Criddle, Fiduciary Foundations, supra note 7, at 126.  
138. Id. at 129. 
139. Id. at 130.  
140. See Criddle, Fiduciary Administration, supra note 7, at 471; Criddle, Mending Holes, supra note 
7, at 1278.  
141. See Criddle, Fiduciary Administration, supra note 7, at 448.  
142. Criddle, Fiduciary Foundations, supra note 7, at 136, 138.  
143. See id. at 139.  
144. Criddle, Fiduciary Administration, supra note 7, at 475. 
145. Criddle, Fiduciary Foundations, supra note 7, at 154-57.  
146. Criddle, Fiduciary Administration, supra note 7, at 489-90.  
147. Id. at 472. Criddle also contends that fiduciary principles should guide judicial review of 
agency actions, contending that the court’s role in policing administrative agencies mirrors 
its role in governing fiduciary relationships. Criddle, Fiduciary Foundations, supra note 7, at 
144-47.  
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governance norms are geared toward a “culture of justification,” in which 
“every exercise of power is expected to be justified” in terms of its advancement 
of the interests of the beneficiaries.148 
Not everyone would accept the claim that administrative-governance 
norms reflect or aspire to such a culture of justification. Public-choice 
approaches see administrators as self-regarding, in contrast with the other-
regarding orientation that the fiduciary theory presupposes.149 Pragmatic 
approaches are skeptical about the possibility of theorizing administrative 
governance, contending instead that the “structure and design of government 
institutions” should be evaluated “by the extent to which they help to mediate 
the conflicting values that make up our administrative legal culture.”150 
Consequentialist approaches contend that the legitimacy of agency action 
should be appraised in terms of overall consequences: actions are legitimate to 
the extent that their benefits outweigh (or, in some versions, can be expected to 
outweigh) their costs.151  
Adrian Vermeule’s work on administrative governance combines each of 
these types of arguments and provides perhaps the clearest contrast to the 
fiduciary theory. For Vermeule, the point of both agency actions and judicial 
review of those actions is the same: to secure the best outcomes, given 
institutional constraints.152 The kind of “optimization” that should guide 
administrative governance is a matter of “making incremental net-beneficial 
moves within the institutional space just up until the point at which the net 
benefits from further moves have diminished to zero—to the point where 
marginal benefits and costs are equal, or roughly equal as far as we can tell.”153 
Furthermore, Vermeule contends that, in areas of administrative governance 
that are legal “black holes” (or “law-free zones that are themselves created by 
 
148. Criddle, Mending Holes, supra note 7, at 1280 (citations omitted). 
149. See, e.g., Peter H. Aranson et al., A Theory of Legislative Delegation, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 47-
52 (1982); Mathew D. McCubbins et al., Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Political 
Control, 3 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 243, 247 (1987). 
150. Sidney Shapiro, Pragmatic Administrative Law, 5 ISSUES LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP 1, 4 (2005); see 
also Ronald M. Levin, Administrative Law Pragmatism, 37 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 227, 231 
(2011) (defining administrative-law pragmatism as “a belief in trying to accomplish social 
ends effectively through the use of the administrative process”). 
151. See, e.g., Matthew D. Adler, Regulatory Theory, in A COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND 
LEGAL THEORY 590, 592-93 (Dennis Patterson ed., 2d ed. 2010); Cass R. Sunstein, The 
Limits of Quantification, 102 CALIF. L. REV. 1369, 1372 (2014). 
152. See ADRIAN VERMEULE, THE SYSTEM OF THE CONSTITUTION 136 (2011) (assuming that the 
principled judge “is a consequentialist who chooses a theory of adjudication on the basis of 
its results”).  
153. Adrian Vermeule, Optimal Abuse of Power, 109 NW. U. L. REV. 673, 693 (2015). 
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law”)154 and “grey holes” (or zones of law that “appear to comport with the rule 
of law but really do not”),155 there is no serious requirement that agencies 
justify their specific actions.156 Further, every standard-based stricture 
applicable to an administrative agency is, at least potentially, a legal grey 
hole.157 
For Vermeule, then, the justification that an agency provides for its action 
is not categorically or fundamentally important to determining whether the 
agency’s action is legitimate. Of course, such public justification might be 
important in virtue of its tendency to promote good consequences. However, 
“[t]he question is always how much justification is enough [to achieve these 
consequences], and that is just another adjustable parameter.”158 By 
implication, some agency actions are legitimate even though they lack 
justification. For example, agencies acting within legal black or grey holes are 
presumptively legitimate.159 Moreover, Vermeule contends that categories of 
ostensibly abusive agency actions might nonetheless be legitimate if the costs 
of monitoring those abuses are not worth the benefits of preventing them.160 
Likewise, for decisions about which the best outcome is uncertain, an agency 
action can be legitimate even though it ultimately lacks (consequentialist) 
 
154. Vermeule, supra note 18, at 1102. 
155. Id.  
156. Id. at 1119-20.  
157. Id. at 1106. To be sure, one might posit a theory of judging along these pragmatic and 
consequentialist lines: that all hard cases are black or grey holes, and legal decision makers 
ought to decide cases in terms of (institutionally constrained) efficiency. For an example of 
this kind of view, see ADRIAN VERMEULE, JUDGING UNDER UNCERTAINTY: AN 
INSTITUTIONAL THEORY OF LEGAL INTERPRETATION (2006). However, this kind of pragmatic 
and consequentialist approach would be unable to capture the norms for judges, about 
which there is at least rough consensus. By contrast, the pragmatic and consequentialist 
approach is more viable in the domain of administrative governance, where there is both an 
established set of norms of cost-benefit analysis and a widely acknowledged conception of 
role responsibility for administrators that draws on their capacities for dynamic and expert 
decision making. Thus, it is at least plausible that the pragmatic and consequentialist 
approach can capture the norms for administrative governance while it is not plausible that 
such an approach can capture the norms for judges.  
158. ERIC A. POSNER & ADRIAN VERMEULE, THE EXECUTIVE UNBOUND: AFTER THE MADISONIAN 
REPUBLIC 109 (2011).  
159. Vermeule, supra note 18, at 1119-21 (describing a “soft look” form of judicial review 
applicable to agency action within a legal grey hole).  
160. Vermeule, supra note 153, at 676 (“An administrative regime will tolerate a predictable level 
of abuse of power as part of an optimal package solution—as the inevitable byproduct of 
attaining other ends that are desirable overall.”).  
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justification, since the agency’s decisional process need not track the first-order 
justifications for its decisions.161  
The divide between the fiduciary theory of administrative governance and 
an alternative like Vermeule’s parallels the contrast between the fiduciary 
theory of judging and its alternatives. In each of these domains, the fiduciary 
theory determines whether an agent has complied with a public-law norm in 
part by examining how the agent deliberates and how she (or it) justifies an 
action. By contrast, the alternative views are outcome centered, either 
deemphasizing deliberation or portraying it as only derivatively important. In 
Section II.A, we demonstrated the advantages of the fiduciary theory of 
judging by identifying several uncontroversial features of the norms for judges 
that the fiduciary theory could, but alternatives could not, easily explain. It is 
more difficult to perform this analysis for theories of administrative 
governance, since an advocate of a fiduciary theory (like Criddle) would 
presumably disagree with an advocate of an alternative view (like Vermeule) 
about the basic contours of the norms for administrative governance.162  
1. Are the Norms of Administrative Governance Deliberation Sensitive?  
At first blush, the answer to this question seems to be yes. A primary aim of 
judicial review of administrative decision making is to ensure that agencies 
comply with specific deliberative processes. Rulemakings must undergo 
“notice and comment” periods,163 which help ensure that agencies have 
conformed to the rules that should govern their conduct. Agency actions must 
either be supported by “substantial evidence,” or else not be “arbitrary” or 
“capricious.”164 In particular, the structure of so-called hard-look review165 
seems geared to discern whether an administrative agency has deliberated in 
the right way. Under hard-look review, courts look to whether an agency has 
“examine[d] the relevant data and articulate[d] a satisfactory explanation for 
its action, including a rational connection between the facts found and the 
 
161. See Adrian Vermeule, Rationally Arbitrary Decisions (in Administrative Law), 44 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 475, 482-83 (2015).  
162. To be fair, Vermeule’s work might be seen as an attempt to articulate the norms that should 
guide administrative governance, rather than an attempt to capture the norms that actually 
do apply in this domain. If so, then Vermeule (unlike Criddle) might embrace the 
revisionist implications of his own approach.  
163. Administrative Procedure Act § 1, 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)-(c) (2012). 
164. Id. § 706(2)(A), (E). 
165. See, e.g., Motor Vehicles Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins., 463 U.S. 29 (1983). 
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choice made.”166 As Criddle notes, this standard requires agencies to show that 
they  
exercised due care by furnishing a full, contemporaneous administrative 
record, explaining in detail the rationale for their decisions, and 
validating departures from past decisions. Agencies’ explanations must 
address all salient aspects of a problem, including the relative costs and 
benefits of reasonable alternatives, and persuade courts that the final 
rule is not inconsistent with the empirical evidence before the agency.167 
In other words, administrative-governance norms see results as important, but 
insufficient to determine the legitimacy of an agency’s actions. It is not enough 
for an agency to reach the correct answer or to arrive at the correct policy. The 
norms of administrative governance can be violated by deficient deliberative 
procedures alone.  
On this construal, administrative-governance norms appear to impose 
freestanding deliberative requirements in exactly the same way as fiduciary 
norms. Consider a recent hypothetical example, contemplated by the Supreme 
Court in Judulang v. Holder,168 of an agency that enacts a policy of adjudicating 
cases before it by flipping a coin. According to the Court, an agency’s 
utilization of such a mechanism to decide which deportable aliens are eligible 
for discretionary relief would be inconsistent with the norms of administrative 
governance and “reverse[d] . . . in an instant” because it would be based on 
factors that are arbitrary and not even “loosely” tied to the broader purposes 
and concerns of the laws that the agency is charged with implementing.169 
Moreover, such a policy would be illegitimate even if the results generated by 
the mechanism could have been justified on “other, more rational bases.”170  
Yet the Court’s stated reasoning does not capture everything that is wrong 
with the use of such “[r]andomizing mechanisms”171 in administrative 
governance. Take the following example: 
Dice Game: A statute instructs an agency to determine which claimants 
are eligible for discretionary relief. The agency (correctly) interprets the 
statute to favor the granting of discretionary relief in the majority of 
cases. The agency enacts a process of deciding claims through a roll of 
 
166. Id. at 43. 
167. Criddle, Fiduciary Foundations, supra note 7, at 153-54 (footnote omitted).  
168. 132 S. Ct. 476 (2011). 
169. Id. at 485.  
170. Id.  
171. Vermeule, supra note 161, at 503.  
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dice. Discretionary relief is denied if the dice roll turns up a prime 
number (2, 3, 5, 7, 11), and it is granted if the dice roll turns up 
composite numbers (4, 6, 8, 9, 10, 12).  
The mechanism in Dice Game evades the Court’s stated criticisms in 
Judulang. The statutory goal of favoring the granting of discretionary relief can 
be said to influence the operation of the mechanism, since the interpretation of 
the dice roll makes a grant of relief more likely than a denial. Thus, the dice 
mechanism is (at least loosely) tied to the statutory purpose in favor of 
granting discretionary relief. Yet we think that the policy described in Dice 
Game is clearly illegitimate. This illegitimacy does not depend on whether 
(over the range of cases) rolling the dice yields the same pattern of decisions as 
would be secured by evaluating claims for relief on their merits. Part of the 
problem in Dice Game is explained by the deliberation sensitivity of 
administrative-governance norms. By definition, randomizing mechanisms like 
flipping a coin or rolling dice do not involve any adjudicative deliberation. This 
failure to deliberate seems objectionable in itself.  
A critic of the fiduciary theory might deny that administrative-governance 
norms are actually deliberation sensitive, arguing that agency deliberation does 
not actually matter in the ways that administrative-law scholars posit that it 
does. For example, Vermeule argues that, in the grey holes that apply to large 
swaths of the administrative state, “hard look” review is illusory.172 In these 
areas, Vermeule contends, there is little actual scrutiny of how an agency 
decides how to act.173 This empirical contention, coupled with Vermeule’s 
conceptual claim that every standard-based administrative-governance norm is 
a potential legal grey hole, would seem to put pressure on the fiduciary theory 
by denying that an agency’s deliberation matters as such, rather than insofar as 
it happens to be connected to specific results. Of course, to refute the fiduciary 
theory, Vermeule would need to provide a link between the potential 
deliberation insensitivity of administrative-governance norms and the 
conclusion that these norms are, in fact and despite rhetorical evidence to the 
contrary, deliberation insensitive. This would amount to an argument that 
deliberation sensitivity is only real if it applies categorically to administrative-
 
172. Vermeule, supra note 18, at 1119 (“In at least a substantial set of national security cases after 
9/11 . . . the cases offer a kind of ‘soft look’ review, under which courts accept looser 
reasoning in support of agency policies and looser factfinding than would usually be 
accepted.”). 
173. Id. at 1125-27.  
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governance norms.174 However, if such an argument could be provided, then 
the deliberation sensitivity of administrative-governance norms might 
plausibly be denied.  
In addition to his positive and conceptual arguments, Vermeule also makes 
the normative point that administrative-governance norms should be 
insensitive to deliberation. For Vermeule, deliberation-insensitive mechanisms 
can be expected to produce better consequences in a variety of contexts, 
including situations where first-order considerations do not unequivocally 
support any particular course of action.175 Along these lines, Vermeule would 
deny the Court’s hypothesis in Judulang, as well as the conclusion that we reach 
in Dice Game. According to Vermeule, when an agency is “focused entirely on 
the purposes of the laws it administers,” but “nonetheless reaches an 
uncertainty frontier at which first-order reasons for making choices in light of 
those purposes simply run out, yet choices must somehow be made,” 
randomization mechanisms (like flipping a coin or rolling the dice) “ought to 
be one perfectly acceptable mode of proceeding . . . .”176 Thus, the critic of 
fiduciary theory might grant that administrative-governance norms in the 
United States happen to be deliberation sensitive, but deny that they should 
be.  
2. Do the Norms of Administrative Governance Impose Standards of 
Conscientiousness?  
Under our framework, a fiduciary theory can explain administrative 
governance only if administrative-law norms impose standards of 
conscientiousness—that is, if not just any token of an agency’s conforming to a 
norm counts as complying with that norm. Here, too, fiduciary theory seems to 
describe extant administrative law. The main standard of judicial review of 
administrative decision making about matters of statutory interpretation—
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.177—seems like a 
 
174. Elsewhere, Vermeule uses a similar argument about the contingent, rather than categorical, 
value of separation of powers as a principle of institutional design in critiquing Jeremy 
Waldron’s work on the subject. See Vermeule, supra note 153, at 20.  
175. See Vermeule, supra note 161, at 503.  
176. Id. at 501-02. Vermeule’s caveat in this quotation concedes a great deal to the culture of 
justification that underlies the fiduciary theory. The suggestion is that, even though the use 
of a randomization mechanism cannot (by definition) track justification, the decision to use 
the randomization mechanism itself must be justified by the circumstances of the situation 
(and, presumably, that use of randomization mechanisms outside of these circumstances 
would be illegitimate).  
177. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).  
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standard of compliance. Under Chevron, only some kinds of reasons qualify as 
good reasons. Chevron calls for review of an agency’s action based on the 
statute that delegates the relevant authority to the agency.178 As a result, the 
range of legitimate reasons for the agency’s action is set by the legislature, 
which (presumably) embodies the people’s objectives. An agency action that is 
not prompted or justified by this set of statutorily delineated reasons is 
illegitimate, regardless of whether that action is justified tout court.  
The Dice Game scenario suggests how conscientiousness matters in 
administrative adjudication. As the Judulang Court hypothesized, the use of a 
randomization mechanism to resolve cases would be illegitimate even if the 
results of using such a mechanism were the same (on the whole) as those that 
would have been obtained through a legitimate decision-making procedure.179  
Standards of conscientiousness also seem to apply to agency rulemaking. 
Recall that the intelligibility of “wrong kinds of reasons” problems in a domain 
provides strong evidence that the domain imposes standards of 
conscientiousness. “Wrong kinds of reasons” problems abound in 
administrative governance, and particularly in the agency rulemaking context.  
The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Michigan v. EPA provides a real-
world example of this phenomenon.180 At issue in this case was an EPA rule 
that regulated emissions of air pollutants from power plants. The EPA was 
authorized to make this rule by its mandate under the Clean Air Act to regulate 
if the agency finds that regulation is “appropriate and necessary.”181 In 
formulating its rule, the EPA did not consider the costs and benefits of 
regulation and, indeed, contended that these “should not be considered” when 
deciding whether power plants should be regulated under the hazardous air 
pollutants program.182 Yet the EPA’s regulatory-impact analysis (which the 
agency was required to prepare and which was not used in the rulemaking)183 
estimated that the direct and ancillary benefits of the rule were between thirty-
seven billion dollars and ninety billion dollars annually while the rule itself was 
estimated to require power plants to bear costs of $9.6 billion per year.184 
 
178. Id. at 842-43. 
179. Judulang v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 476, 485 (2011). 
180. 135 S. Ct. 2699 (2015).  
181. Id. at 2701 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 7412(n)(1)(A) (2012)).  
182. Id. at 2705. 
183. See Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51735, 51738, 51741 (Sept. 30, 1993) (requiring a 
cost-benefit analysis for all rules with an annual economic effect of at least one hundred 
million dollars); Exec. Order No. 13563, 76 Fed. Reg. 3821 (Jan. 18, 2011) (reaffirming Exec. 
Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51785). 
184. 135 S. Ct. at 2706 (citing 77 Fed. Reg. 9305, 9306 (Feb. 16, 2012)).  
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Moreover, the EPA contended, while the agency did not consider costs in “first 
deciding whether to regulate power plants,” it would consider costs 
subsequently in implementing the rule.185  
The Supreme Court struck down the EPA rule. Based on the “foundational 
principle of administrative law that a court may uphold agency action only on 
the grounds that the agency invoked when it took the action,”186 the Court held 
that the EPA rule was unlawful because of the agency’s failure to consider cost 
as part of its deliberations. According to the Court, it did not matter that the 
EPA’s regulatory-impact analysis showed that “once the rule’s ancillary 
benefits are considered, benefits plainly outweigh costs.”187 In other words, the 
agency’s failure to consider a relevant factor was sufficient to show that its 
action was illegitimate, independent of whether that factor actually would have 
supported the agency’s action.188  
Taken at face value, Michigan v. EPA suggests that an agency’s compliance 
with administrative-governance norms turns on the reasons for which an 
agency acts, not merely the reasons that could justify its action. As such, the 
Court’s analysis invokes the “wrong kinds of reasons” problem: the reasons 
that motivated the EPA to promulgate the regulation diverged from the reasons 
that justified (or could have justified) its action, and this divergence ultimately 
compromised the legitimacy of the action.189 If “wrong kinds of reasons” 
problems arise in the administrative-law context, then administrative-
governance norms appear to impose standards of conscientiousness. These 
conclusions are consistent with fiduciary theory.190  
 
185. Id. at 2709.  
186. Id. at 2710 (citing SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 87 (1943)).  
187. Id. at 2711.  
188. Id. (“[W]e may uphold agency action only upon the grounds on which the agency acted. 
Even if the Agency could have considered ancillary benefits when deciding whether 
regulation is appropriate and necessary—a point we need not address—it plainly did not do 
so here.”). 
189. Michigan v. EPA also suggests that the norms of administrative rulemaking are deliberation 
sensitive. One way to read the Court’s decision is as contending that the EPA’s refusal to 
consider costs was a deliberative failure, and this failure was problematic even if the agency 
would have acted the same way had it actually considered the cost of the rule. Id. at 2710.  
190. Of course, the decision in Michigan v. EPA does not definitively support the fiduciary theory 
of administrative law, since the case does not establish or directly address the main tenets of 
that view. For example, because the Court analyzes the EPA’s deliberative responsibilities 
under the guise of interpreting the Clean Air Act, see id. at 2704, the opinion does not prove 
that these responsibilities apply solely by virtue of the EPA’s having discretionary authority 
(as any fiduciary theory of administrative law would likely contend). Nor does the case 
necessarily support Criddle’s contention that the people as a whole are the ultimate 
beneficiaries of the agency’s actions. See Criddle, Fiduciary Foundations, supra note 7. 
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A critic of the fiduciary theory might deny that the norms of administrative 
governance impose standards of conscientiousness in this way. This denial 
might be stated at a very general level. Recall that the standards of 
conscientiousness contrast with agnosticism about compliance or the position 
that conforming to a norm is just as good as following it and that any route to 
conforming with a norm is just as successful as any other route. Agnosticism 
about compliance is an article of faith among many administrative-law 
scholars,191 although it is inconsistent with fiduciary theory192 and seems to be 
in tension with the holding of Michigan v. EPA. 
More specifically, one could deny that there are conscientiousness 
standards for administrative governance in the following way, which parallels 
the Vermeule-inspired argument (described above) for denying that 
administrative-governance norms are deliberation sensitive. First, there are no 
conscientiousness standards in legal black and grey holes. The existence of such 
standards would conflict with the urgency and inscrutability that leads to their 
creation. To put this point less formally, it would be difficult to imagine the 
Court extending its reasoning in Michigan v. EPA to the military. Second, on 
Vermeule’s logic, every area of administrative law is potentially a grey hole. 
Third, every such grey hole is at least potentially agnostic about compliance. 
Fourth, conscientiousness standards are only real if they apply categorically 
within a domain.193 Thus, on this argument, the norms of administrative 
governance do not impose standards of conscientiousness, despite appearances 
to the contrary.  
We do not think that this argument is sound. In particular, the first and 
second premises strike us as false, and the conceptual claim in the fourth 
premise seems unwarranted. Nonetheless, the argument is valid. Thus, it is at 
least plausible that the norms of administrative governance do not impose 
conscientiousness.  
Vermeule might also offer a consequentialist argument for why 
administrative-governance norms should not have conscientiousness 
 
191. See, e.g., Jonathan B. Wiener & Barak D. Richman, Mechanism Choice, in RESEARCH 
HANDBOOK ON PUBLIC CHOICE AND PUBLIC LAW 363, 365 (Daniel A Farber & Anne Joseph 
O’Connell eds., 2009) (contending that choices of regulatory mechanism should be based 
on judgments about “comparative[] superior[ity in] achiev[ing] particular social objectives 
under particular market conditions”).   
192. Criddle, Fiduciary Foundations, supra note 7, at 157 (“The fiduciary duties of care and loyalty 
apply not only to agencies’ use of these regulatory tools but also to their choice between these 
tools.”).  
193. Here, too, the argument attributed to Vermeule resembles one that he has made against 
Waldron’s discussion of the categorical value of separation of powers. See Vermeule, supra 
note 153, at 688-92.  
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standards. In general, requiring conscientiousness makes it more difficult for 
an agent to comply with a norm and increases the costs of monitoring when an 
agent has complied with a norm. In a variety of contexts (especially those in 
which first-order reasons are indeterminate, yet some sort of decision must be 
made), it will be impossible for an agency to be conscientious. Vermeule might 
also contend that standards of conscientiousness produce no clear benefits.194 
In most cases, the state of the world in which an agency acts for an 
inappropriate reason is exactly the same as the state in which that agency acts 
for an appropriate reason. By comparison, agnosticism about compliance can 
be expected to lower the costs of complying and of monitoring compliance, 
while producing the same or similar level of valuable activity. If what matters 
are the ways that an agency acts and not why it acts in those ways, then 
requiring agency conscientiousness seems both unnecessary and inefficient. 
Although we think this argument is inconsistent with core democratic values, it 
is at least plausible.  
3. Are the Norms of Administrative Governance Robust?  
Administrative-governance norms seem robust in at least one sense: 
because they impose requirements to advance the interests of the public, the 
specifics of these requirements morph given changes in the circumstances of 
the people. Both Criddle and Vermeule would accept that the authority given 
to administrative agencies is and should be open-ended in this way,195 although 
some scholars of administrative law might not.196 Yet Criddle and Vermeule 
would disagree about the implications of these open-ended responsibilities. For 
Criddle, the requirement of public justification morphs along with changes in 
how the requirement that agency action advance the public interest is 
conceived.197 By contrast, on Vermeule’s theory, the open-endedness of agency 
 
194. Along these lines, a consequentialist like Vermeule might criticize the Court’s decision in 
Michigan v. EPA as wasteful. The majority’s disposition essentially delayed the 
implementation of a rule in order to require the EPA to provide an analysis of costs that it 
had already undertaken (as part of its regulatory-impact analysis) and was going to do 
anyway as part of implementing the rule.  
195. See Criddle, Fiduciary Foundations, supra note 7, at 183 (noting that fiduciary theory 
incorporates facets of administrative law “as mutually reinforcing forces” in the 
administrative state’s open-textured legal architecture); Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian 
Vermeule, Libertarian Administrative Law, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 393, 414 (2015) (“[S]ince the 
beginning of the Republic, [Congress] has allowed agencies to exercise a great deal of open-
ended authority.”).  
196. See, e.g., PHILIP HAMBURGER, IS ADMINISTRATIVE LAW UNLAWFUL? (2014). 
197. See Criddle, Fiduciary Foundations, supra note 7, at 138 (“[A]gencies look beyond Congress’s 
specific intent to the broader public interest.”). 
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responsibilities calls for de-emphasizing justificatory requirements, and 
perhaps abandoning them altogether.198 Vermeule sees such justificatory 
requirements as self-defeating: to require that an agency justify its action in 
terms of serving the public interest is to impede its capacity to serve those 
interests.  
Whether the norms of administrative governance impose an updating 
requirement is a more contentious question. Recall that, if a norm imposes an 
updating requirement, living up to that norm requires an agent to seek out and 
respond appropriately to new information related to the advancement of the 
principal’s interests. Both of these requirements can be violated actually (if the 
agent does not seek out relevant information or does not consider it in making 
her decisions) or counterfactually (if the agent is disposed not to seek out new 
information, or would be disposed not to consider it if it were on offer).  
Do administrative-governance norms impose an updating requirement? A 
fiduciary theorist like Criddle would likely say yes. Michigan v. EPA can be read 
to support the proposition that an agency’s failure to seek out or utilize relevant 
information in deciding how to act undermines the legitimacy of its action. 
Agencies could be understood under current law to have obligations to update 
and revise their rules in accordance with the public interest aims of the statutes 
that delegate rulemaking authority to them. Consider the Administrative 
Procedure Act (APA) petition process, which provides that “[e]ach agency shall 
give an interested person the right to petition for the issuance, amendment, or 
repeal of a rule.”199 If an agency wants to deny a petition, it also must furnish 
actual reasons for its denial.200  
The APA further provides for judicial review to “compel agency action 
unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed,”201 suggesting that certain 
failures to update or revise regulations can be scrutinized by the judiciary. 
Indeed, the Supreme Court’s decision in Massachusetts v. EPA reinforces the 
claim that courts are willing to interrogate an agency’s decision not to regulate. 
In that case, the EPA had attempted not to decide whether greenhouse-gas 
emissions contribute to climate change. The Court found that the EPA’s 
inaction was not supported by a “reasoned justification.”202 New climate 
science essentially required the EPA to update and revise its regulatory 
approach to different kinds of pollutants. 
 
198. See Vermeule, supra note 18, at 1106.  
199. Administrative Procedure Act § 1, 5 U.S.C. § 553(e) (2012). 
200. See id. § 555(e). 
201. Id. § 706(1). 
202. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 534 (2007). 
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To be fair, administrative law is equivocal on this point. Rarely do courts 
scrutinize an agency’s inaction or its failures to enforce, regulate, repeal, or 
amend its requirements.203 Even in Massachusetts v. EPA, the Court 
acknowledged that the standard of its review of agency inaction is “highly 
deferential.”204 Furthermore, the state of administrative law on this point is not 
irrefutably consistent with the fiduciary theory. Although the fiduciary theory 
of administrative governance provides an argument for why agency inaction is 
problematic,205 a critic might contend that the fiduciary theory is revisionist 
because it attributes more significance to agency inaction than courts typically 
do. The fiduciary theory suggests that agency inaction should be scrutinized on 
par with agency action, but the latter is clearly policed much more stringently 
than the former.  
Vermeule, for his part, would deny that the updating requirement applies 
to administrative-governance norms. Vermeule contends that, if the likely costs 
of inquiry exceed the likely benefits of the product of that inquiry, then an 
agency’s failure to seek out new information relevant to its decision does not 
affect the legitimacy of that decision.206 Vermeule would also likely point to the 
Court’s acknowledgment that the standards for reviewing agency inaction are 
“highly deferential”207 as evidence that failures of inquiry cannot, by 
themselves, compromise the legitimacy of an agency decision. Vermeule would 
also presumably deny that a violation of administrative-governance norms 
could be inferred from an agency’s use of an insensitive decision procedure, as 
suggested by his contention that randomization mechanisms for making 
agency decisions ought to be “one perfectly acceptable mode of proceeding.”208 
Randomization mechanisms are, by definition, insensitive to new information, 
or any information for that matter. For Vermeule, as long as the benefits from 
utilizing an insensitive decision mechanism are expected to outweigh its costs, 
 
203. See Interstate Commerce Comm’n v. Bhd. of Locomotive Eng’rs, 482 U.S 270, 286 (1987) 
(holding that an Interstate Commerce Commission decision not to clarify a prior approval 
order was not reviewable under the APA); Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 837 (1985) 
(holding that an FDA decision not to enforce the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act’s 
ban on a substance used for lethal injection was not reviewable under the APA); see also 
Cellnet Commc’n, Inc. v. FCC, 965 F.2d 1106, 1111 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (reviewing refusals to 
initiate rulemaking with “deference so broad as to make the process akin to non-
reviewability”). 
204. 549 U.S. at 528 (quoting Nat’l Customs Brokers & Forwarders Ass’n v. United States, 883 
F.2d 93, 96 (D.C. Cir. 1989)). 
205. Criddle, Fiduciary Administration, supra note 7, at 482-84. 
206. See Vermeule, supra note 153, at 693.  
207. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 528 (quoting Nat’l Customs Brokers & Forwarders Ass’n, 883 
F.2d at 96). 
208. Vermeule, supra note 161, at 501-02. 
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a decision made according to that mechanism is consistent with the norms of 
administrative governance.  
 
*** 
 
Whether a fiduciary theory is viable in the domain of public administration 
depends on whether it is structurally compatible with the norms of 
administrative governance. Yet scholars dispute how to characterize the norms 
for administrative governance (and, in particular, whether these norms are 
deliberation sensitive, have standards of conscientiousness, and impose an 
updating requirement). Criddle would likely contend that each of these 
features characterizes the norms of administrative governance. We agree with 
this characterization, but perhaps that only means that we, like Criddle, are 
“romantics” about administrative law.209 Many scholars (particularly those of 
consequentialist, pragmatic, and public-choice stripes) would deny that these 
features characterize the norms of administrative governance, or that they 
should. These nonfiduciary views are not obviously incorrect or incomplete (as 
they appear to be in the domain of judging), and they can explain many of the 
same results that the fiduciary model explains without utilizing contested 
moral concepts or calling for greater policing of the intentions of political 
actors. 
Our framework, then, leads to a modest conclusion: whether the fiduciary 
theory of administrative governance works depends on how one construes the 
fundamental norms of administrative governance. Absent a resolution of these 
issues, the fiduciary theory’s viability is an open question.  
C. A Fiduciary Theory of International Law 
In a series of articles and books, Evan Fox-Decent and Evan Criddle have 
articulated a fiduciary theory of international law.210 Although Fox-Decent and 
Criddle focus on jus cogens and human rights, they contend that their insights 
apply more broadly to other topics in international law (such as jus ad bellum, 
belligerent occupation, and humanitarian law).211 Their fiduciary theory differs 
significantly from the historical invocations of the fiduciary concept in 
 
209. Thanks to Aaron Saiger for suggesting this term. 
210. See CRIDDLE & FOX-DECENT, FIDUCIARIES OF HUMANITY, supra note 6; sources cited supra 
note 6. 
211. See CRIDDLE & FOX-DECENT, FIDUCIARIES OF HUMANITY, supra note 6.  
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international law, in which fiduciary principles were prominently deployed to 
support unjust policies like expropriation and colonialism.212  
For Fox-Decent and Criddle, the case for a fiduciary theory of international 
law arises out of the conjunction of two abstract principles of political morality, 
as well as a conceptual claim about political authority. The principle of 
nondomination holds that states must not “assum[e] arbitrary power over 
people’s legal and practical interests,” and the principle of 
noninstrumentalization holds that states must always treat those subject to 
their authority “as ends rather than mere means.”213 How can one person (or 
agent) exercise power over the legal and practical interests of another without 
dominating the other or treating her as an instrument? To answer this 
question, Fox-Decent and Criddle invoke the “fiduciary principle,” which 
“authorizes the fiduciary to exercise power on the beneficiary’s behalf but 
subject to strict limitations arising from the beneficiary’s vulnerability to the 
fiduciary’s power and his intrinsic worth as a person.”214 The fiduciary 
principle applies to all relationships in which one party “holds discretionary 
power of an administrative nature over the legal or practical interests of 
another party”215 and the latter party is vulnerable to the former party’s power 
(where vulnerability is defined as an inability “either as a matter of fact or law, 
to exercise the entrusted power”).216 The relationship between the state and the 
subject exhibits all of these hallmarks. According to Criddle and Fox-Decent, 
each state is therefore a fiduciary, and all those who are subject to its power are 
its beneficiaries. When a state’s action does not comport with fiduciary norms, 
the state breaches its fiduciary duties.  
In what follows, we focus on Fox-Decent and Criddle’s discussion of 
human rights, which play a central role in their fiduciary theory of 
international law.217 For Fox-Decent and Criddle, respect for human rights is a 
“normative consequence[] of the state’s assumption of sovereign powers and 
[is] thus constitutive of sovereignty’s normative dimension. A state that fails to 
. . . respect human rights subverts its claim to govern and represent its people 
 
212. For a discussion of the historical uses of the fiduciary concept, see Purdy & Fielding, supra 
note 10. 
213. CRIDDLE & FOX-DECENT, FIDUCIARIES OF HUMANITY, supra note 6 (manuscript at 4). 
214. Fox-Decent & Criddle, Human Rights, supra note 6, at 314.  
215. Id. at 311. 
216. FOX-DECENT, supra note 10, at 4.  
217. The theory of human rights is not only one of the best-developed aspects of Fox-Decent and 
Criddle’s project, but is also one of the areas of international law that seems most hospitable 
to fiduciary theorizing. Most of our criticisms of the fiduciary theory of human rights can be 
applied to the other areas of international law to which a fiduciary theory might be applied.  
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as a sovereign actor.”218 Human rights function to “protect persons subject to 
state power from domination and instrumentalization,” and the category of 
“genuine” human rights includes everything necessary to realizing 
nondomination and noninstrumentalization.219  
Our framework suggests that Fox-Decent and Criddle’s fiduciary theory of 
human rights is problematic and, more broadly, that fiduciary norms are 
structurally incompatible with extant norms of international law. Our critique 
leaves open whether it would be a good idea to restructure international law to 
reflect fiduciary norms, since Fox-Decent and Criddle do not address this 
question.220 
Consider the following scenario: 
Solicitude: State A enacts a policy of not extraditing those within its 
territory to State B. The sole rationale for this policy is that State A 
wants to curry favor with State C (which is antagonistic to State B). 
Unbeknownst to the officials of State A, State B has a policy of 
torturing those in its custody. Thus, State A’s policy has the effect of 
protecting the human rights of those within its territory. 
Does State A violate the norms of human rights law, specifically, the 
United Nations Torture Convention,221 in Solicitude? We think the answer is 
clearly no. Regardless of whether State A’s action breaches norms applicable to 
domestic policymaking, it does not violate any norm of international human 
rights.  
Yet the fiduciary theory would reach the opposite conclusion. State A’s 
policy runs afoul of the principle of nondomination: any protection of human 
 
218. Fox-Decent & Criddle, Human Rights, supra note 6, at 310.  
219. Id. at 326. 
220. Accordingly, we do not construe Fox-Decent and Criddle’s project as offering a purely 
normative theory of international law, an account of what international law should aspire to 
be. It seems to us that such a purely normative deployment of fiduciary norms would fit well 
with other theories of international human rights law. Cf. Allen Buchanan, Human Rights 
and the Legitimacy of the International Order, 14 LEGAL THEORY 39, 62 (2008) (arguing that 
institutions for identifying human rights ought to provide “venues for deliberation in which 
the authority of good reasons is recognized, in which credible efforts are made to reduce the 
risk that strategic bargaining or raw power will displace rational deliberation, in which 
principled contestation of alternative views is encouraged . . . and in which conclusions 
about human rights are consonant with the foundational idea that these are moral rights 
that all human beings (now) have, independent of whether they are legally recognized by 
any legal system”). 
221. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment art. 2.1, opened for signature Dec. 10, 1984, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 100-20 (1988), 
1465 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter Torture Convention].  
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rights would be based on a factor that is not directly related to the interests of 
the beneficiaries, namely whether the policy pleased State C. Moreover, State A 
treats human rights as a “mere means” to curry favor with State C, in violation 
of the noninstrumentalization principle. This discrepancy between what 
fiduciary duty requires and how human rights norms actually work suggests 
that fiduciary theory is inapposite to this area of law.  
In the remainder of this Section, we elaborate on this argument by 
analyzing in more granular detail whether the core features of fiduciary norms 
are compatible with the norms of international human rights law.  
1. Are the Norms of International Law Deliberation Sensitive?  
Human rights norms govern state behavior. The obligations they impose 
primarily concern how states behave.222 They do not, in general, impose 
freestanding requirements regarding how a state must deliberate.223 A state 
complies with human rights norms to the extent that human rights are realized 
in that state. On this logic, state action (or inaction) that has the effect of 
protecting human rights does not violate human rights norms, even if the 
action (or inaction) arises out of a deliberative process that is obviously 
deficient.  
Of course, deliberation matters when determining whether human rights 
norms have been breached. For example, whether specific behavior counts as a 
violation of human rights can often depend on how specific actors deliberate.224 
 
222. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES ch. 
1, intro. note at 17 (AM. LAW INST. 1987) (“International law is law like other law, promoting 
order, guiding, restraining, regulating behavior.”); Oona A. Hathaway, Do Human Rights 
Treaties Make a Difference?, 111 YALE L.J. 1935, 1964-65 (2002) (arguing that “compliance is 
an elastic concept that allows for different gradations” and “[l]aws often incorporate a zone 
within which behavior is considered to ‘conform’ even if it is not consistent with the letter of 
the legal obligation,” so “[c]ompliance with human rights treaties must . . . be defined on a 
continuum based on the degree to which behavior deviates from the legal requirements of 
the treaties”).  
223. See, e.g., Steven R. Ratner, Persuading To Comply: On the Deployment and Avoidance of Legal 
Argumentation, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: SYNTHESIZING 
INSIGHTS FROM INTERDISCIPLINARY SCHOLARSHIP 568, 585 (Jeffrey Dunoff & Mark Pollock 
eds., 2013) (“[T]he modes of argumentation adopted by institutions seeking to promote law 
show that they are more than willing to settle for compliance
 
given the hurdles to obedience. 
That is, the choices that persuading entities make regarding the modes of legal 
argumentation are choices about how to achieve behavior consistent with the law—about 
respect for law in the broadest sense of the term. They are not seeking to persuade a target 
to internalize a norm, though they are not opposed to it when that is feasible.”). 
224. For example, whether an infliction of “severe pain or suffering” constitutes torture in the 
first place turns on the essentially deliberative questions of whether the actor intends to 
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However, such examples indicate that the manifestation requirement applies to 
human rights norms: how a state (or other actor) deliberates is relevant only to 
the extent that this deliberation is manifest in behavior. In other words, human 
rights norms appear sensitive to deliberation in the same way as criminal 
norms, but not in a manner analogous to fiduciary norms. 
Consider the human right to be free from torture. Article 3 of the United 
Nations Torture Convention states that no party to the Convention “shall 
expel, return . . . or extradite a person to another State where there are 
substantial grounds for believing that he would be in danger of being subjected 
to torture.”225 Compliance with this norm is primarily a matter of behavior. To 
be sure, deliberation matters to some questions related to compliance.226 
However, deliberation is only relevant in virtue of a state’s behavior; the 
Convention does not establish freestanding deliberative requirements in the 
way that fiduciary norms do.  
There are several good reasons why human rights norms are not 
deliberation sensitive. First, the most central goods secured by international 
law seem capable of being achieved solely through the realization of outcomes. 
One of the main aims of international law is to facilitate coordination in a way 
that “protects political communities from external aggression” and “protects 
citizens of those communities from domestic barbarism.”227 Achieving this aim 
does not necessarily require concern with how agents deliberate. Coordinated 
activity by agents who exhibit wildly divergent and even incompatible patterns 
of deliberation (for example, through an “incompletely theorized agreement”) 
would be sufficient to achieve the main purpose of international human rights 
law.228 A second explanation is the inscrutability of state intentions. It is very 
difficult to establish how a state deliberates, especially given the lack of shared 
ends and (on many issues) shared understandings of basic concepts that 
characterize the field of human rights. A third explanation is based on efficacy. 
 
inflict these conditions on another and for what reasons the actor inflicts the pain and 
suffering. See Torture Convention, supra note 221, art. 1.1.  
225. Id. art. 3.1. 
226. For example, to determine whether there are substantial grounds for believing that 
extradition would render someone “in danger of being subjected to torture,” the Convention 
requires officials to “take into account all relevant considerations including, where 
applicable, the existence in the State concerned of a consistent pattern of gross, flagrant or 
mass violations of human rights.” Id. art. 3.  
227. Ronald Dworkin, A New Philosophy for International Law, 41 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 2, 22 (2013). 
228. See Jennifer Prah Ruger, Toward a Theory of a Right to Health: Capability and Incompletely 
Theorized Agreements, 18 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 273, 279, 309 (2006) (articulating the concept 
of incompletely theorized agreements, where “[p]eople may agree on individual judgments 
while disagreeing on the level of general principle,” as an “approach to collective decision 
making in public policy and human rights”).  
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Getting states to behave in ways that protect human rights is vexing enough.229 
If human rights norms were deliberation sensitive, then the costs of complying 
with these norms would be far more burdensome (and compliance would be 
far more invasive of state sovereignty) than if compliance were construed 
primarily in behavioral terms. Thus, there are significant costs, but few 
obvious benefits, to imposing freestanding deliberation requirements on 
human rights norms.  
2. Do the Norms of International Law Impose Standards of 
Conscientiousness?  
Here, too, the answer seems to be no. To say that human rights norms 
primarily govern behavior is to imply that any way of conforming to these 
norms, however motivated, counts as compliance.230 As one commentator puts 
it, compliance with human rights norms “may thus take different forms, from 
coincidence to convenience (so as to cash in on potential incentives), obedience 
(so as to avoid sanctions) or internalization (when attitudes and beliefs change 
in line with international norms and become constitutive behaviour).”231 A 
state’s conscientiousness or lack thereof is generally irrelevant to establishing 
whether it has complied with human rights norms.232  
 
229. See Hathaway, supra note 222, at 1940 (“[N]oncompliance with treaty obligations appears to 
be common.”). 
230. See Kal Raustiala & Anne-Marie Slaughter, International Law, International Relations and 
Compliance, in THE HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 538, 539 (Walter Carlsnaes et 
al. eds., 2002) (noting that the concept of compliance with norms of international law does 
not gauge motivations and is “agnostic” about which factors cause states to act). 
231. Gerd Oberleitner, Does Enforcement Matter?, in THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO HUMAN 
RIGHTS LAW 249, 252 (Conor Gearty & Costas Douzinas eds., 2012); see also Harold Hongju 
Koh, How Is International Human Rights Law Enforced?, 74 IND. L.J. 1397, 1406 (1998) 
(stating that considerations related to power, self-interest, national identity, communitarian 
identification, and legal process combine to explain why nations obey international human 
rights law).  
232. On this point, one might defend the fiduciary theory by positing that a state must act in 
“good faith” (as implicit in the doctrine of pacta sunt servanda) in order to count as 
complying with human rights norms. See generally Anthony D’Amato, Good Faith, in 2 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 599, 599-601 (Rudolf Bernhardt ed., 1995). 
Most public international lawyers agree, however, that good faith, to the extent that it has 
definitive content at all, is not a freestanding requirement. See Oliver Dörr & Kirsten 
Schmalenbach, Article 26. Pacta Sunt Servanda, in VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF 
TREATIES 427, 435 (Oliver Dörr & Kirsten Schmalenbach eds., 2012) (noting that the 
International Court of Justice understands the concept of pacta sunt servanda “as a 
background principle informing and shaping the observance of existing rules of 
international law but being not in itself a source of obligation where none would otherwise 
exist” (citations omitted)). As such, whether a state has acted in good faith or bad faith 
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The fiduciary theory reaches the opposite conclusion: a state whose 
behavior conforms to the requirements of human rights norms but whose 
motivations are inappropriate would nonetheless breach those norms. In 
Solicitude, for example, State A’s motivation for protecting the human rights 
of its population is not connected to the justification for human rights. 
Moreover, State A seems to actively violate Fox-Decent and Criddle’s principle 
of noninstrumentalization, since it protects human rights merely as a means of 
currying favor with State C. Fiduciary theory reaches an implausible conclusion 
in the Solicitude scenario, then, because it imposes standards of 
conscientiousness that do not characterize existing human rights norms.  
There are also good reasons for international law’s general agnosticism 
about compliance. Evidentiary difficulties in assessing the reasons for state 
action weigh in favor of determining compliance through purely objective 
considerations.233 Moreover, given the divergent ends of states in international 
law, states can be expected to differ about which considerations justify the 
protection and promotion of human rights. As such, requiring that the reasons 
motivating a state’s action are congruent with the reasons that legally justify its 
action would invite discord in an already contentious policy space. 
Furthermore, requiring congruence would secure no definite benefit, since 
what matters most in the international sphere seems to be that human rights 
are protected, not why they are protected. 
The notion that human rights norms impose standards of 
conscientiousness is also highly revisionist. Such standards would be 
anomalous on nearly every extant theory of international law. Other than 
Criddle and Fox-Decent, theorists of international law routinely presume that a 
state’s conforming behavior is sufficient to establish its compliance.234 The 
application of conscientiousness standards would also be inconsistent with the 
understandings of many human rights lawyers and activists.235 If international 
 
matters only in virtue of nonconforming behavior. On this logic, then, to conform to a 
human rights norm in bad faith is to comply with it.  
233. For example, Brian Orend conjectures that “[i]nternational law does not include” the rule of 
right intention among the criteria for authorized aggression for pragmatic reasons, such as 
“the evidentiary difficulties involved in determining a state’s intent.” Brian Orend, War, 
STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (July 28, 2005), http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/war [http:// 
perma.cc/USF4-VKCM].  
234. See, e.g., Hathaway, supra note 222, at 1944-62 (contending that realist, institutionalist, 
liberal, managerial, fairness, and transnational legal process models of international law 
each operationalize compliance in terms of behavior).  
235. For example, conformity with human rights norms based on a state’s reputational concern 
or out of habit would not exhibit the conscientiousness that the fiduciary theory seems to 
demand. Yet many human rights activists seek to animate exactly these concerns in 
encouraging states to better protect human rights. See, e.g., ROBERT F. DRINAN, THE 
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human rights norms imposed standards of conscientiousness, many 
fundamental tenets of international law (such as reciprocity and concern for 
reputation) would be unjustifiable or inadequate.236  
3. Are the Norms of International Law Robust?  
Human rights norms are clearly robust in that the responsibilities that they 
impose may morph, given changes in the needs or interests of people.237 For 
example, the Torture Convention requires signatories to both criminalize 
torture and take “such measures as may be necessary” to establish criminal 
jurisdiction over instances of torture committed by its nationals or within its 
territories.238 The open-endedness of human rights norms is consistent with, 
but does not uniquely support, the fiduciary theory. A variety of other theories 
of human rights might also be able to capture this open-endedness.  
Fiduciary theory would be directly supported if human rights norms 
imposed an updating requirement. Yet the updating requirement is inapposite 
in the context of international human rights law. While compliance with 
human rights norms often requires a state to investigate human rights 
abuses,239 these requirements are not capable of purely counterfactual 
violation: a state complies with human rights norms if it investigates abuses, 
 
MOBILIZATION OF SHAME: A WORLD VIEW OF HUMAN RIGHTS 34 (2001). If, as the fiduciary 
theory posits, there are conscientiousness standards to human rights norms, then all such 
efforts by human rights activists are conceptually confused because the resulting conformity 
would not count as compliance with human rights norms.  
236. For example, the fiduciary theory would see compliance with human rights norms based on 
reciprocity as deficient. If “wrong kinds of reasons” problems applied to human rights 
norms, then the protection of human rights based on reciprocity concerns would violate 
human rights norms because there would be a divergence between the state’s motivations 
and the considerations that justify protecting human rights in the first place. Yet reciprocity 
and reputational concerns seem to be perfectly acceptable reasons for protecting human 
rights under extant norms. See ROBERT O. KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY: COOPERATION AND 
DISCORD IN THE WORLD POLITICAL ECONOMY 106 (1984) (noting that states comply with 
their agreements for “reasons of reputation, as well as fear of retaliation and concern about 
the effects of precedents”). 
237. See Fox-Decent & Criddle, Human Rights, supra note 6, at 317. According to Fox-Decent and 
Criddle, because the institutional arrangements necessary to protect subjects from 
instrumentalization and domination “are liable to change over time and vary across 
jurisdictions, there is no reason to think that the present catalogue of human rights  
is complete or invariant. The catalogue may change because threats to agency and dignity  
may change or because contemporary threats may be newly apprehended by human rights 
 law . . . .” Id. 
238. Torture Convention, supra note 221, arts. 4-5.  
239. See, e.g., id. arts. 6.2, 12. 
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even if it would not have done so under other, unrealized circumstances. 
Likewise, whether a state’s decision procedure is insensitive to the fruits of its 
investigation cannot, by itself, establish a breach of human rights norms, since 
deliberation has no independent relevance in determining a state’s compliance 
with these norms. In the Solicitude scenario, the flimsiness of State A’s 
commitment to protecting the rights against torture of those within its 
territory might be a ground for criticism, but it does not by itself indicate a 
violation of the Torture Convention.  
Therefore, while the requirements imposed by human rights norms are 
robust in one sense, they are not robust in all of the ways that fiduciary norms 
are.  
 
*** 
 
To summarize, fiduciary norms are structurally incompatible with the 
extant norms of international human rights law. Moreover, this 
incompatibility arises in other areas of international law to which Fox-Decent 
and Criddle apply the fiduciary theory.240 The fiduciary theory of international 
law thus does not provide an accurate picture of human rights law, or 
international law more generally.  
Our arguments about the incompatibility between fiduciary norms and 
international law are empirical, rather than conceptual. It is possible to imagine 
a version of the international legal order that enshrines a robust “culture of 
justification” like the one that Criddle sees at the core of administrative law,241 
although there are good reasons why (given our existing institutions) 
international-law norms do not police deliberation or impose standards for 
compliance or robustness. Nor do we think the search for a moralized theory of 
international law is futile.  
The structural incompatibility we identify here, however, directly 
challenges whether any fiduciary theory can capture the extant structure  
of international-law norms. Our analysis suggests that one cannot 
straightforwardly derive the fundamentals of international law from the 
principles of nondomination and noninstrumentalization. Not every type of 
 
240. For example, a fiduciary theory would be structurally incompatible with the laws of war if 
(as some contend) the legal status of a state’s decision to go to war does not turn on the 
state’s motives and patterns of deliberation. Cf. Gabriella Blum & John C.P. Goldberg, War 
for the Wrong Reasons: Lessons from Law, 11 J. MORAL PHIL. 454, 470-71 (2014) (“To the extent 
intentions matter [to jus ad bellum] at all, they are useful only as a means to ascertain the 
existence of a just cause . . . or otherwise to ensure that a war was in fact necessary or 
proportionate, not as an independent legal condition.”). 
241. See, e.g., Criddle, Mending Holes, supra note 7, at 1280. 
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authority relationship (or every domain of public law) is concerned with 
domination and instrumentalization in the same way. Perhaps the world would 
be a better place if the same rigorous culture of justification applied to the 
international legal realm. But that is not the world we live in, nor is it the one 
that Criddle and Fox-Decent purport to describe.242  
conclusion 
This Essay shows the promise and limits of fiduciary political theorizing, a 
burgeoning field of legal scholarship. One aim has been to provide new 
insights into the features that distinguish fiduciary norms from other types of 
legal norms, like the norms of contract, tort, and criminal law. Another aim has 
been to harness these insights into a framework for determining when 
fiduciary political theory is likely and unlikely to illuminate a public-law 
domain.  
We demonstrated the utility of our framework by applying it to three case 
studies. The fiduciary theory of judging is successful, and likely superior to 
alternative theories of judging, in explaining and justifying the norms for 
judges. The viability of the fiduciary theory of administrative governance turns 
on fundamental questions about the structure of administrative law—questions 
that have not been satisfactorily resolved. Finally, the fiduciary theory of 
international law appears incompatible with the structure of the governing 
norms in human rights law and elsewhere in international law. These case 
studies demonstrate that fiduciary political theory is most appropriate in 
domains of law that enshrine what Criddle calls a “culture of justification” and 
least appropriate in areas where coordination (rather than justification) is what 
matters.  
We consider the revival of fiduciary political theory to be one of the most 
exciting developments in legal and political philosophy in recent years. 
Fiduciary political theory offers common ground from which legal scholars and 
 
242. See Fox-Decent & Criddle, Human Rights, supra note 6, at 314 (“[T]he state-subject fiduciary 
relationship is actual, whereas the social contract is a fiction. The state’s fiduciary duties are 
therefore actual rather than hypothetical.”). To be sure, even if Fox-Decent and Criddle’s 
fiduciary theory does not describe how extant international law actually operates, the 
justificatory culture that it envisions might be a worthy standard to which the international 
legal order should aspire. See, e.g., JOHN RAWLS, THE LAW OF PEOPLES 56 (1999) 
(contending that “the ideal of the public reason of free and equal peoples is realized, or 
satisfied, whenever chief executives and legislators . . . act from and follow the principles of 
the Law of Peoples and explain to other peoples their reasons for pursuing or revising a 
people’s foreign policy and affairs of state that involve other societies”). However, this kind 
of “regulative ideal” interpretation differs from the way that Fox-Decent and Criddle 
construe their project.  
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legal theorists can address many perennial questions about justice and politics. 
We hope the framework offered here clarifies the ambitions of this project and 
aids fiduciary political theorists in their efforts to explain and improve our lives 
under law. 
